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Organisational information has been acknowledged to be a valuable asset which 
must be protected no matter where it is accessed from or how it is accessed. Mobile 
devices such as smartphones and tablets are becoming a popular means of 
accessing the organisation’s information whether it is on a company-owned or 
personal mobile device. This has led to an increased awareness of potential risks to 
the organisation within the mobile device environment which requires organisations 
to be more vigilant with regards to information security governance. The objective of 
the research was, therefore, to investigate how organisations go about implementing 
information security governance within the mobile device environment. 
The research was conducted at a Retail company where two mobile device 
implementations took place. The research philosophy was interpretive and the 
research strategy employed was a grounded case study which allowed theory to be 
developed using a combination of the grounded theory methodology and the case 
study method. The use of a mixed approach, deductive and inductive, allowed a 
conceptual framework to be developed from literature which was used as a 
sensitising device to start the data collection and analysis process. Qualitative data 
was collected from multiple sources such as semi-structured interviews and 
company documents. 
The theory developed shows how organisations go about implementing information 
security governance within the mobile device environment. Mobile information 
security governance implementations are triggered by risks to company information, 
the company’s mobility strategy and also the strongest concept in the study, the 
mobility audit. Once the mobile information security governance has been 
implemented, any changes or new proposals to the mobile environment cannot be 
implemented without the consideration of the newly implemented mobile information 
security governance. As a result of this, there are benefits to the organisation from a 
risk management perspective such as the mitigation of risks to the organisation’s 
information. However, one of the most prominent consequences, as highlighted by 
this study, of remaining compliant with mobile information security governance is the 
impact on the satisfaction of the employees. The theory suggests that if 
organisations ignore the satisfaction of the employees while trying to protect the 
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organisation’s information, it may result in implications such as an interference with 
employee’s job roles, productivity and compliance with policy.  
The theory also indicates that a close relationship exists between governance, risk 
management and compliance, all working together to ensure that a secure 
environment is provided for the organisation. 
This research contributes to the understanding of how organisations may go about 
implementing information security governance within the mobile device environment 
and has highlighted issues that organisations may struggle with such as change 


















































































































































Organisational business processes are driven by information which involves 
employees at all levels of the organisation from the lowest levels to the highest 
levels. Today, information is used to gain competitive advantage and has grown to 
become the lifeblood of many organisations (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2006; Von 
Solms & Von Solms, 2005; Posthumus & Von Solms, 2004). Information, therefore, 
needs to be protected so that the impact of threats are minimised. Threats such as 
social engineering which is used to commit fraud seem to be on the increase (de 
Oliveira Alves, da Costa Carmo, & de Almeida, 2006) and since the use of 
information systems inherently has risks (Williams & Andersen, 2001), information 
security governance (ISG) is recommended as being vital to addressing all these 
risks (Von Solms, 2006). Simultaneously, the benefits and value that can accrue 
from having secure information systems should be recognised (Williams & Andersen, 
2001). Information needs to be protected so that business opportunities are 
maximised and that the business continues to run smoothly (de Oliveira Alves et al., 
2006).  
The advancement of technology exposes company information in different ways 
since the line between the work environment and personal life has merged with 
communication options such as instant messaging, social media sites and video 
conferencing (Cisco, 2008) used beyond traditional email for communication 
(Gordon, 2007). In the past, organisations would normally provide employees with 
the necessary devices such as laptops and smartphones to do their work. Today, 
people are more tech-savvy and may find that the equipment that the companies 
provide as obstructive, officious and even old-fashioned. The chances of employees 
bringing their own devices to work have become more and more likely. Employees 
generally feel like they are more productive with their own smartphones, tablets and 
laptops because they have chosen it themselves, rather than using devices that the 
organisation obliges them to use (Mansfield-Devine, 2012). This concept referred to 
as “Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) “is the practice of employees bringing personally 
owned mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets, and laptops) to their place of 
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work, and using those devices to access company resources such as email, file 
servers, and databases” (The Security Executive Council, 2013, p.1). Traditionally, 
information needed to only be protected on company assets, now organisations 
need to ensure the protection of company information on the personal mobile 
devices of employees as well. 
4.2 PURPOSE 
Until recently, businesses have been relaxed about the information security risks on 
these mobile devices (Hart, 2013) but in order for  BYOD implementations to be 
successful, the unique issues presented with BYOD must be considered and 
addressed in light of existing data privacy, confidentiality and acceptable use 
practices (The Security Executive Council, 2013). Effective governance must be 
established as failing to do so can have serious implications. Sufficient rigour must 
be applied to safeguard the organisation which is done by means of implementing 
information security governance (Moulton & Coles, 2003). 
The objective of the research was to determine how organisations go about 
implementing information security governance within the mobile device environment. 
4.3 GAPS IN LITERATURE 
A global information security survey conducted by Ernst and Young (2012) shows an 
increase in the number of external attacks noticed by respondents from 41% in 2009 
to 71% in 2011 and to 77% in 2012 as well as an increase in internal vulnerabilities. 
The survey suggests that only a few organisations are keeping up with an ever-
changing risk landscape (Ernst & Young, 2012) due to technological advancements 
such as mobile computing. Information security governance ensures that the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the company’s electronic assets are 
maintained (Von Solms, 2006).  
Literature on how organisations go about implementing information security 
governance in the context of the mobile environment and the “BYOD” phenomenon 
is important and highlighted by a 2012 trend survey which reported that “nearly half 
of companies that permit BYOD reported experiencing a data or security breach as a 
result of an employee-owned device accessing the corporate network” (Harris, 2012, 
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p. 4). These organisations have reacted to these security breaches by installing 
security software, restricting data access rights or completely revoking BYOD 
privileges (Harris, 2012). According to the McAfee mobile and security report “four in 
10 organizations have had mobile devices lost or stolen and half of lost/stolen 
devices contain business critical data, such as customer data, corporate intellectual 
property and financial information” (as cited in Li, Clarke, Cowan, Papadaki & 
Dowland, 2011, p. 1).  
Kotulic and Clark (2004) agree that information security may be one of the most 
critical areas for research since it is necessary for supporting the viability of the 
organisation. It is especially critical within the BYOD phenomenon since 
organisations interviewed as part of the 2012 trend survey report widely agreed that 
the growth of BYOD is inevitable in future and that senior management are ready to 
invest in making the implementations as smooth as possible even though there is an 
understanding of the possible risks (Harris, 2012).  
The next section discusses the literature review followed by the research design, 
timeline, analysis and results, limitations and future research and, lastly, the 
conclusion. 
5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review starts by discussing the movement from corporate governance 
to IT governance to information security governance. This is followed by a brief 
history of information security, a discussion on what information security governance 
is, why information security governance is important, implementing information 
security governance using best practices and lastly, mobile devices in the workplace. 
5.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO IT GOVERNANCE TO INFORMATION 
SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is relied on by CEOs and senior managers to ensure that the 
business is able to respond to internal and external pressures (Saetang & Haider, 
2011). In the past, few board members understood that information assets reside in 
various applications in the infrastructure and that many business decisions rely on 
the information contained in these assets (Short & Gerrard, 2009). Many are not 
4 
 
aware of how much the continuing operations of their organisation rely on IT (Nolan 
& McFarlan, 2005) since it is difficult to isolate and review because the use of IT is 
often embedded within other processes as systems cross internal organisational 
boundaries (Coen & Kelly, 2007). 
Many organisations failed financially due to an excessive focus on return on 
investment (e.g. Worldcom and Enron). Organisations have had major data 
breaches or theft due to improper storage of data, such as CardSystems Solutions. 
Organisations have realised their limitations, such as not having a backup system, 
as a result of their computer system failing (e.g. Tokyo Stock Exchange) 
(Raghupathi, 2007). This led to a shift in focus to the concept of IT governance in the 
nineties even though the need for guidance on the use of IT was required since the 
early days of computing (Simonsson, Lagerstrom, & Johnson, 2008). An important 
purpose of IT governance is to ensure that information systems are secure by 
effectively controlling risk. The integration of computers into aspects of everyday life 
and the increase in the frequency of security breaches or cyber attacks indicate the 
growing importance of information security governance (Xiaomeng, Bolzoni, & Van 
Eck, 2007).  
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that information contained in annual reports is 
signed off by the board. Chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers 
(CFOs) need to be able to demonstrate that their organisations have proper internal 
controls (Von Solms, 2006) and attest to the financial reports being accurate as 
stated in section 302 (Na-yun, Robles, Sung-Eon, Yang-Seon, & Tai-hoon, 2008). 
The increase in security breaches and the legislative requirements has resulted in 
security aspects of information such as the security policies, procedures and security 
controls being audited since it seems like a futile exercise to audit organisations 
financial accounts without verifying that the information is adequately and 
appropriately secured (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). If the systems maintaining the 
data are not secure, it is hard to signoff the validity of the data (Von Solms, 2006) 
and, therefore, business managers need to accept the responsibility and 





Dlamini, Eloff and Eloff (2009) state that information security during the computer 
age dates back to the 1940s when the first computers came into existence, followed 
by the time of mainframe computers. The only security issues that needed to be 
considered were that only privileged computer operators were permitted to have 
access and that the computers and storage media were not damaged by outsiders or 
stolen, but the data was safe. During the early 1970s dumb terminals enabled 
multiple users to have access to one computer which posed a risk to data because 
unauthorised people may have been able to access to it. Physical security was no 
longer enough, so user identification and authentication was introduced. Later 
networks and multi-user systems were introduced with the mini computer which led 
to access controls to prevent users from interfering with one another’s workspace 
(Dlamini et al., 2009). This marked the first phase of information security referred to 
by Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) and Von Solms (2006) which was characterised by the 
“technical people” only using technical measures such as firewalls, biometrics and 
passwords to mitigate threats to information and to secure the IT environment. 
Information security was only seen as a technical issue that the technical experts 
needed to resolve (Von Solms, 2006). 
It soon became apparent that management needed to become involved (Da Veiga & 
Eloff, 2007) and the importance of policies was recognised (Von Solms, 2006). 
Information security then became incorporated into organisational structures (Da 
Veiga & Eloff, 2007). This second phase was marked by management involvement 
and the technical protection mechanisms mentioned earlier continuing in parallel (Da 
Veiga & Eloff, 2007). The third phase related to creating a security culture within the 
organisation (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007) since people have been recognised as often 
being the weakest link in security and not the expected answer of some “older” 
technology that no longer meets the requirements of the security environment 
(Bresz, 2004). Information security had to become a part of an employee’s job so 
that it becomes a way of life (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007). Even though it was realised 
years ago that management’s security consciousness and corporate culture needs to 
be addressed (Williams & Andersen, 2001), past studies in information security 
consistently report that the awareness of managers and users is lacking and a major 
obstacle (Rhee, Ryu, & Kim, 2012). A South African information security survey 
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conducted in 2011 confirmed that the overall lack of commitment from senior 
management to information security continues to be challenging (Wolfpack, 2011).  
The fourth phase is the realisation of the crucial role that information security 
governance plays and its development (Von Solms, 2006). Dlamini et al. (2009) 
warns that attackers have matured and no longer attack machines but target people 
for financial gains resulting in risks such as social engineering, fraud, identity theft 
and phishing all of which are the key drivers of this phase of information security 
governance (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007).  
5.3 WHAT IS INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE? 
Information security has received great attention with the development of IT 
governance. Many uncertain factors resulting in damages to the organisation are 
difficult to quantise after their occurrence. An important purpose of IT governance, 
therefore, is to ensure that information systems are secure by effectively controlling 
risk (Jian, Wei-hua, & Wen-jing, 2011). Information security is concerned with the 
integrity (ensuring accuracy of information and processing methods), confidentiality 
(ensuring authorised access) and availability (ensuring access to information and 
assets by authorised users only) of the data that are contained in computer systems 
and the safeguarding thereof (Xiaomeng et al., 2007). 
Information security governance is defined as “the processes that ensure the 
requisite actions are taken to protect the organization’s information resources, in the 
most appropriate and efficient manner, in pursuit of its business goals” (Scholtz, 
2011a, p.2). Figure 1 depicts it is as having the following macro processes:   
• Planning 
• Implementation 
• Management and 





The term information security governance (ISG) has also been described as “the 
process of how information security is addressed at an executive level” (Posthumus 
& Von Solms, 2004, p.639). Other authors have not only defined it as “the act of 
directing and controlling an organisation aligned with the strategy and business 
objectives” but includes the following to the definition, “establishing and retaining a 
culture of information security, optimising the related processes (based on indicators 
and learned lessons), and assigning activities to the most competent people to 
perform the necessary actions” (De Oliveira Alves et al., 2006, p.72). This definition 
is depicted in Figure 2. The authors have also mentioned that all these actions need 





Moulton and Coles, (2003, p. 581), however, only refer to it as being “the 
establishment and maintenance of the control environment to manage the risks 
relating to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and its 
supporting processes and systems” and explicitly excludes  
• audit  which ensures the proper establishment and functioning of governance 
processes,  
• security operations which are the security administrative activities that are 
performed on a day to day basis and  
• security developments such as meeting security objectives by creating new 
processes). 
 
Harris (2007, p.74) describes it as follows: “Security governance is all the tools, 
personnel, and business processes necessary to ensure that the security 
implemented meets the organisation’s needs. It requires organisational structure, 
roles and responsibilities, performance measurement, defined tasks and oversight 
mechanisms”. 
 
Von Solms (2001), however, suggests that information security governance is but 
one dimension of information security as a whole which has to do with the way that 
information is structured and organised in a company. This dimension is completely 
separate from the policy dimension or awareness dimension or any of the other 




An integrated view which synthesises aspects from all the definitions by  
Von Solms (2006, p. 167) states that information security governance consists of “ 
• the management commitment and leadership,  
• organizational structures,  
• user awareness and commitment,  
• policies, procedures, processes,  
• technologies and  
• compliance enforcement mechanisms,  
 
all working together to ensure that the confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) 
of the company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, hardware, people, 
etc.) are maintained at all times”.  
 
The researcher has adopted this definition and further elaborates on each aspect of 
the definition in the sub-sections, technologies (5.3.1.1), policies, procedures and 
processes (5.3.1.2), establishing and retaining a security culture (5.3.1.3), 
organisational structures (5,3,1,4), roles and responsibilities (5.3.1.5), awareness 
(5.3.1.6) and lastly, compliance (5.3.1.7). 
5.3.1 INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE THEMES 
5.3.1.1 TECHNOLOGIES 
Information security technologies are used to secure information at the application, 
host and network level. These technologies such as the ones depicted in Figure 3 
provide countermeasures for security problems such as hackers sending malicious 
code to servers connected to the internet causing the servers to fail. The taxonomy 
is based on whether the specific technology is proactive, meaning that measures are 
taken to secure data before a security breach occurs, or reactive meaning that 
measures are taken immediately to secure data as soon as there is a detection of a 
security breach (Venter & Eloff, 2003). Levine (2005), however, states that an 
important aspect of data security solutions is that it should be transparent to the 
user. A user wanting to take a memory stick home to complete a work related 
document should not be stopped but at the same time it should be possible to lock 





This part of security governance also referred to as information security operational 
management, includes activities such as firewall management, which sets the rights 
on firewalls, and identification and authentication management, which is the adding, 
deleting and changing of usernames from the database, has thus far always been 
well understood (Von Solms, 2005b). These technical aspects are vital (Dhillon & 
Backhouse, 2000) but the non-technical aspects such as policies, awareness and 
compliance enforcement mechanisms have been recognised as pivotal to good 
information security governance (Von Solms, 2005b). The next sections, therefore, 
discusses the non-technical aspects of information security governance. 
5.3.1.2 POLICIES, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 
The environment within an organisation influences the beliefs and attitudes of 
employees. Senior management has the power to actually change the culture of an 
organisation and, therefore, it is important for management to articulate the vision of 
the organisation in terms of information security. One way of doing this is via a 
formally agreed upon corporate information security policy which will demonstrate 
the dedication of senior management to information security (Thomson, Von Solms, 
& Louw, 2006). 
The development of documentation such as policies, procedures, standards and 
guidelines are recommended as a key factor for the implementation of information 
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security (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007). Stevens (2007) suggests that a document 
hierarchy is established as displayed in Figure 4 which can be used as a 
communication tool which explains which documents are applicable to senior 
executives, business managers, end users and other stakeholders. This structured 
approach improves awareness and compliance because the stakeholders are able to 
access documents that are applicable to them and they do not need to read 
unnecessary lengthy detailed documents (Stevens, 2007). 
 
FIGURE 4 ‐ DOCUMENT HIERARCHY (STEVENS, 2007) 
Developing proper security policies for risk mitigation is regarded as part of security 
governance (Mishra & Dhillon, 2006) which define rules on how an organisation 
wishes to operate and also clear statements on approaches to ensure the protection 
of information assets (Ward & Smith, 2002). It includes security objectives as well as 
the methods of achieving those objectives (Karyda, Kiountouzis & Kokolakis, 2005). 
Walton (2002) also recognises that the mitigation of risks can only be achieved 
through an information assurance programme that is built on a solid strategic 
foundation defined by policy and not merely the implementation of malicious code 
prevention, firewalls, incident response or any other tactical countermeasures. The 
emphasis should not just be on these technical measures but security should rather 
be viewed as an ongoing process in which organisations take on the mindset that 
security policies will evolve over time to cater for evolving security vulnerabilities and 
attacks (Levine, 2005).  
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Ward and Smith (2002), however, highlights that the dissemination of the policies are 
equally important and is the first step towards providing an understanding for the 
need for security. Despite the common practice of developing and using security 
policies, when implementing the security policy often the goals are not accomplished 
even though information security management best practices and guidelines are 
available (Karyda et al., 2005). Organisations are still at risk because their 
information security policies are not followed by their employees (Siponen, 
Mahmood, & Pahnila, 2009). Ordinary employees who don’t always understand all 
the risks are not the only ones guilty. Computer security professionals that attended 
the RSA 2002 conference participated in an informal survey which showed that 91% 
of them break their own company policies (Hinde, 2002); this is a serious threat to 
the organisation (Siponen et al., 2009) and indicates that information security 
governance programmes fail as a result of not addressing the beliefs, individual 
values and the means of encouraging the conformity with the organisation’s policies 
(Mishra & Dhillon, 2006).  
The following theme, therefore, discusses the establishment of a security culture 
within the organisation. 
5.3.1.3 ESTABLING AND RETAINING A SECURITY CULTURE 
People are vital to the success of any organisation (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004) and 
are extremely important in the role as frontline defence of the organisation (Dhillon, 
Tejay & Hong, 2007) but they have also been referred to as the weakest link when it 
comes to information security (Bresz, 2004; Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). 
The risk of fraud being committed using social engineering seems to be increasing 
(Von Solms, 2006); employees often fall prey to hackers and their social engineering 
ploys (Dhillon et al., 2007). The amount of security incidents by employees inside the 
organisation exceeds the amount of security breaches with outsiders according to 
the 2001 information security industry survey; this behaviour is unacceptable (Vroom 
& Von Solms, 2004). This has resulted in the realisation by senior management that 
the information security problem cannot solely be solved by technical means. High 
level strategic decisions need to be made to ensure that all the users of the 
organisation are aware of the possible risks because the human side of using IT 
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systems by employees, customers and clients can cause serious risks irrespective of 
the amount of money that is spent on technical measures (Von Solms, 2006).  
Vroom and Von Solms (2004) argue that in order to change the culture of an 
organisation to a more secure society, not only should the behaviour of the individual 
be changed but it needs to be changed at the group level, which is made up of 
individuals and also develops unique characteristics which should be examined, as 
well as at the formal organisational level. The development of a security culture 
requires a security consciousness that needs to be created amongst employees 
through a set of norms, values and beliefs which results in a unique character of the 
organisation which constitutes its culture (Mishra & Dhillon, 2006).  
Vroom and Von Solms (2004) describe an utopian information security culture as 
one where the guidelines of the organisation are followed by the employees 
voluntarily as part of their second nature. An example provided by the authors 
describe that employees automatically backup their laptop files on the first Monday 
of every month because it is part of the organisation’s culture. These behavioural 
aspects of information systems security governance have been neglected since 
more research is done with regards to the technical aspects yet it is recognised as 
an integral part of an information systems security governance program (Mishra & 
Dhillon, 2006). 
5.3.1.4 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES 
The importance of the structure and organisation of the information security within an 
organisation is essential for the success of an information security governance plan. 
Several codes of best practices for information security management stress the 
importance of having a proper information security organisational structure which 
includes the creation of an information security forum (Von Solms & Von Solms, 
2004). McMillan and Scholtz (2010) suggest that the information security governance 
forum should consist of representatives from mid-level to senior-level management 
from lines of business, IT, audit and risk. 
Scholtz (2011b) recommends the distribution of the responsibilities for security 
functions via the organisational functions depicted in Figure 5 as follows:  
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• The organisation wide strategic processes such as policy management, 
program management, risk management and business continuity 
management is the responsibility of the strategic corporate function. 
• Security processes such as technical architecture design, vulnerability 
assessments and disaster recovery together with oversight processes such as 
incident monitoring and policy compliance are the responsibility of the IT 
security function. 
• Technology implementation, configuration and administration activities are the 
responsibility of the IT security operations function. 
• Local business continuity planning, awareness, training and policy 
management are the responsibility of business unit security functions. 
• Maintaining clear accountability, authority, responsibility and budget for 
information security is the responsibility of the governance function. 
 
FIGURE 5 ‐ INFORMATION SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES MODEL (SCHOLTZ, 2011B) 
This corporate information security team, depicted in Figure 5, within the 
organisational structure reinforces the involvement of the business in information 
security governance and that it is not just an IT function. The fact remains, however, 
that barriers for the creation of the structure recommended in Figure 5 still exist, 
which prevents or provides resistance to an information security governance 
programme’s development, such as the fact that it still continues to be seen as an 
operational component of IT (Johnson & Hale, 2009).  
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Williams (2007), however, states that one holistic entity should be created which is 
an integration of all the different functions that have been previously responsible for 
aspects of security. Whenever any threats to corporate information or assets arise 
within the organisation, this entity will be capable of recognising, preventing and 
even reacting to them. An example supplied is the bringing together of more than 
530 employees from the IT, corporate and physical security divisions of British 
Petroleum (BP) in order to protect the organisation globally by devising plans. The 
plan of linking physical security to IT security will enable the monitoring of employees 
who have logged onto their workstations against whether the employees have 
actually physically entered the building (Williams, 2007). 
5.3.1.5 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Information security is everyone’s responsibility from the general members of staff all 
the way up through all levels of management to the CEO and board of directors 
(Humphreys, 2008) but if all employees involved do not understand their roles and 
responsibilities, the organisation will not be able to protect the integrity, 
confidentiality and availability of its information (Thomson et al., 2006). It is, 
therefore, important that people understand the protection available to them when 
faced with threats (Furnell & Clarke, 2012) and also when they are the ones causing 
the threat to the organisation. Willison and Warkentin (2013) refer to employee 
violations which may be passive such as employees who are poorly trained, 
careless, unmotivated or who accidentally enter incorrect data values. Examples of 
such behaviour are the failure to change passwords regularly, failure to shred 
sensitive documents, delays in making data backups or failure to select strong 
passwords (Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Employees may not understand that these 
actions may result in harm to the organisation without them specifically intending to 
do so therefore, Williams and Andersen (2001) agree with the International 
Federation of Accountants that clearly communicating individual roles, responsibility 
and authority is a major activity. All interested parties should be involved but 
ultimately the responsibility lies at the board level (Williams & Andersen, 2001). They 
should have an understanding of why information security needs to be governed and 
that they also have several responsibilities to ensure that information security 





A stakeholder is any individual or group such as customers, suppliers, employees, 
stockholders, governments and other groups who may have an affect on or who can 
be affected when an organisation’s objectives are either achieved or not (Clement, 
2005). The idea is that organisations will be successful in performance such as 
stability, profitability and growth if they practice stakeholder management. Anyone 
who has the ability to affect corporate policies should pay attention to all appropriate 
stakeholders when developing policies or establishing organisational structures since 
without their support the organisation would cease to exist. This implies that 
executive management must encourage the assistance from stakeholders, in this 
case information security employees, to achieve the desired results of the 
organisation such as stability (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) or the protection of its 
information assets. Since the theory applies to all stakeholders who can develop 
policies, it is assumed that in organisations where IT professionals are responsible 
for the development of polices, that from IT perspective, executive management 
needs to be taken into consideration and maybe the encouragement in terms of their 
involvement as far as security initiatives should then be initiated from the IT 
department. 
5.3.1.5.2 EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT 
The fact that information security has often been dealt with as a technology issue 
means that the governance and the management of security improvements has 
been limited to technical and operational managers (Williams & Andersen, 2001). It 
has often been thought of as easier to buy a solution than to change the culture and 
has often resulted in poorly integrated solutions that leave gaps in protection 
because they are difficult to manage (IT Governance Institute, 2008). No longer can 
it simply be delegated to roles such as the chief information security officer (CISO) 
since corporate information is recognised as a business asset and, therefore, 
business management needs to be responsible for the overall governance and 
assurance of security’s effectiveness (Williams, 2007). This means that executive 
management is responsible for ensuring that a secure information systems 





The task of ‘securing’ the organisation is often left to the chief information security 
officer (CISO) without any specific guidance in terms of what needs to be secured, 
why it needs to be secured, what the priorities are and how to ensure that people will 
agree to them (Xiaomeng et al., 2007). According to Heiser and Scholtz (2009) this 
is changing as the role of the CISO is moving up in the organisational structure and 
is, therefore, interacting with decision makers higher up in the organisation on a 
regular basis since they have a higher level of prestige. The authors expect that the 
“security” and technical aspects of the role will become de-emphasised as the CISOs 
position receives greater visibility within the organisation. 
Everyone in the organisation, however, plays a part in information security 
governance from the driver who is responsible for delivering the products to the 
customers, to the data entry clerk on the shop floor, right up to the chairman on the 
board (Von Solms, 2006) including executive management and business process 
owners. The implementation requires skilled resources such as security 
professionals, information security auditors and technology providers (Williams & 
Andersen, 2001). Moulton and Coles (2003) have also expressed the importance of 
the involvement of both the primary and secondary risk owners, they need to have 
the opportunity and ability to ensure that the most appropriate and cost effective 
controls are implemented via the information security programme and that they 
continue to function as intended. 
Kritzinger and Smith (2008) grouped the primary responsibilities of information 
security into six IT authority levels as depicted in Figure 6 below which suggests that 
information security should be implemented following a top-down approach and on 
the other hand a bottom-up approach should be followed to report information 
security incidents. In this way, security incidents will be escalated to the board level 
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As discussed earlier, organisational information cannot be protected if employees do 
not understand their roles and responsibilities and this makes training employees to 
protect information assets a vital aspect (Thomson et al., 2006). Whitman (2003) 
states that an employee security training and awareness programme should be 
designed and implemented to educate the employees about the security 
implementation within the organisation and also relay the importance of security. 
Since employees deal with vital information on a daily basis, the information security 
programme seeks to keep security on the minds of the employees (Whitman, 2003) 
and also proactively prevent security attacks and security breaches due to ignorance 
(Mishra & Dhillon, 2006) since inadequate knowledge about security mechanisms is 
at the root of employees “insecure” behaviour  (Adams & Sasse, 1999). When 
devices are lost, users generally do not realise that confidential data has been lost 
and might fall into the wrong hands, they tend to be more worried about getting a 
replacement device which indicates a lack of user awareness (Gorge, 2006).  
 
On the other hand, despite the extensive publicity of security breaches, the 
awareness and commitment of management to information security by previous 
studies continues to be low (Rhee et al., 2012). The authors Rhee et al. (2012) argue 
that an understanding of the threats may not be enough for someone to take 
precautionary or preventive action because people tend to believe that the negative 
event is unlikely to happen to them and that they are less at risk than others. This is 
referred to as optimistic bias. The study conducted by Rhee et al. (2012) regarding 
the perceptions of executives with regards to information security reveals that 
optimistic bias on security management does exist. Even though the executives have 
an understanding of the reality of information security risks, they do not associate the 
reality of the risks with themselves and, therefore, their perception of the information 
security risks are much lower than others. This comparison is a need that people 
have to evaluate themselves by using measures and when there are none available, 
they compare themselves with other people. This is referred as the social 







Increasing an end-user’s compliance with information security policies is a 
fundamental requirement for any information security initiative. Adhering to the core 
activities as defined by the information security policies is referred to as compliant 
information security behaviour (Padayachee, 2012). Williams and Andersen (2001) 
re-iterate that educating users on policies that have been issued and expecting 
compliance from everyone is something of the past. Other factors such as the user’s 
perception of security play a part in ensuring that users comply with security 
mechanisms (Adams & Sasse, 1999).  
Many suggestions have been made as to why employees would comply with security 
policies such as: 
• Making security policies visible so that it can be taken seriously by the 
organisation (Adams & Sasse, 1999) and positive social pressure. The 
promotion of security through education and campaigns in a visible manner 
significantly affects employee’s adherence to policies. The authors argue that 
even media reports of information security breaches should be made visible 
and discussed with employees (Siponen et al., 2009). 
• Making potential and existing threats to the organisation’s systems and 
information explicit so as to avoid users perceiving security mechanisms as 
tedious motions that they are forced to go through (Adams & Sasse, 1999). By 
making it clear, it will change the employee’s perception of the existence of 
security threats also referred to as perceived vulnerability (Siponen et al., 
2009). 
• Making the systems and information that are sensitive clear since not all 
information are equally sensitive to avoid users making their own judgements 
based on their own experience (Adams & Sasse, 1999). 
• Making it known that unacceptable behaviour such as employees who 
circumvent security mechanisms will be challenged otherwise users will tend 
to assume that it makes no difference if no action is taken when security has 
been compromised. On the other hand, if the perceived threats to security are 
low, it may foster careless behaviour because the impression is that the 
security mechanisms are invincible (Adams & Sasse, 1999). 
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• A change in the employee’s perception of the severity of the threats or degree 
of potential psychological or physical harm to the organisation referred to as 
perceived severity (Siponen et al., 2009) which is identified as one of the 
factors of the protection motivation theory (PMT). PMT is based on perceived 
severity, which is the degree of harm, perceived vulnerability, which is the 
probably of the threat actually happening, and fear arousal which refers to the 
amount of fear that is invoked by the threat. This theory is relevant in the 
context of information security because a threat that will affect the 
organisation will most likely affect the employee within the organisation. It also 
implies that the beliefs of an employee with regards to the importance of 
information security policies may come from their understanding of how 
effective the security policies would be in the event of the security threat 
materialising (Herath & Rao, 2009). 
• The belief of employees as to whether they are able to apply or adhere to the 
security policies referred to as self-efficacy (Siponen et al., 2009). 
• The belief of employees that an effective way of preventing security threats is 
by complying with security policies referred to as response efficacy (Siponen 
et al., 2009). 
5.4 WHY IS INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE IMPORTANT? 
Several reasons have been found in literature as to why information security 
governance is important such as the fact that information should be seen as a 
strategic business asset, adherence to legal requirements, risks to company 
information whether they are old or new and audit compliance. All these are further 
discussed in the next section. 
5.4.1 INFORMATION AS A STRATEGIC BUSINESS ASSET 
Information is critical to an organisation’s success and is one of its most valuable 
assets (Von Solms, 2001) and must, therefore, be appropriately protected in the 
same way as any other important corporate asset (Mishra & Dhillon, 2006). 
Information is a shared asset amongst all employees of the organisation and 
employees, therefore, need to be encouraged to take ownership of their share in 
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order for it to be protected from all possible distortions (Mishra & Dhillon, 2006). 
However, other stakeholders need to be considered as well such as customers, 
suppliers and business partners. Convenient ways of accessing information and 
business services are constantly being demanded by these stakeholders which 
ultimately mean that organisations are required to share their business information 
resources more openly. This results in sensitive business information being exposed 
not only to the technology being used to store, process and transmit it but also to the 
people accessing the information as well as the business processes applied to 
manipulate the information as part of the business service or operation that is being 
provided by the organisation (Posthumus & Von Solms, 2004). 
5.4.2 ADHERENCE TO LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
Organisations are expected to adhere to legal requirements such as the South 
African Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (2002) and the 
International Basel II Accord or severe prosecution may be faced (Posthumus & Von 
Solms, 2004). Credit card information storage and transmission is also addressed by 
the Payment Card Industry standard (PCI) which emphasises that security measures 
must ensure that data cannot be transmitted, copied or accessed by unauthorised 
personnel. This applies to mobile devices users as well (Gorge, 2006). 
 
Another example is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which came about in 2002 as a result of 
a number of accounting and corporate scandals (Na-yun et al., 2008). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that information contained in annual reports is signed 
off by the board. CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) need to be able to 
demonstrate that their organisations have proper internal controls (Von Solms, 2006) 
and attest to the financial reports being accurate as stated in section 302 (Na-yun et 
al., 2008).  
5.4.3 RISKS TO COMPANY INFORMATION 
Raghupathi (2007) refers to many examples of organisations that have fallen into 
financial ruin due to excessive focus on return on investment such as Worldcom and 
Enron, organisations that have had major data breaches or theft due to improper 
storage of data, such as CardSystems Solutions, and organisations that have 
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realised their limitiations, such as not having a backup system, as a result of their 
computer system failing, such as the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Companies such as 
Tyco and Parmalat have been mentioned by Short and Gerrard (2009) in addition to 
the ones already mentioned and referred to as corporate scandals which have 
heightened the attention of corporate governance. All of these scenarios illustrate the 
urgency of IT governance (Raghupathi, 2007). In the same way, the integration of 
computers into aspects of everyday life and the increase in the frequency of security 
breaches or cyber attacks indicate the growing importance of security governance 
(Xiaomeng et al., 2007). 
 
A key to the protection of a company’s information assets and the governance of the 
organisation is risk management. Enterprise risk management identifies security 
risks that could impact the organisation negatively and that adequate controls are in 
place to prevent potential losses. An organisation will not be able to implement 
effective protection if the risks are not known (Humphreys, 2008). The risk 
management process depicted in Figure 7 is suggested by Humphreys (2008). 
 
FIGURE 7 ‐ RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS (HUMPHREYS, 2008) 
An information security governance process should be in place to ensure that due 
diligence is undertaken when dealing with the protection of company assets against 
risks. This means that information security risks must be identified and assessed and 
effective controls must be implemented and regularly reviewed and monitored so 
that the organisation’s information assets are protected (Humphreys, 2008). 
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Information security governance seeks to protect the organisation’s electronic assets 
against threats, some of which are old and have been around for a long time and 
others which are new. Some of these threats are discussed in the next section. 
5.4.3.1 DATA LEAKAGE AND EMPLOYEE MISTAKES 
There are always side effects to the advancements of technology such as the failure 
of employees to safeguard the organisation’s equipment and especially sensitive 
data (Cisco, 2008). The leakage of sensitive data was recognised as one of the most 
pressing security issues five years ago (Sophos, 2008) and is still regarded as one of 
the top ranked issues today that is foreseen as a huge concern in the future (ISACA, 
2012).  
Data leakage also known as information leakage is described as “the unauthorised 
transmission of data (or information) from within an organisation to an external 
destination or recipient” (Gordon, 2007, p. 6). Data may be leaked via a physical 
method or electronically and does not automatically mean that it was a malicious or 
intentional action by the employee; it is possible that data leakage was unintentional 
or inadvertent (Gordon, 2007) meaning by mistake. 
Traditionally, activities such as installing anti-virus software, firewall management 
and configuring security settings on servers and workstations have been regarded as 
vital to securing the organisation’s environment which created the misconception that 
it is a technical job (Von Solms, 2005b). Later it was realised that non-technical 
aspects such as policies, awareness and compliance enforcement mechanisms are 
recognised as pivotal to good information security governance (Von Solms, 2005b).  
Even though the development of policies has been recommended as a key factor for 
the implementation of information security (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007) all organisations 
have not developed security policies since a global security survey across 10 
countries and 2000 employees on data leakage revealed that many organisations do 
not have any security policies in place and those organisations that did were 
ineffective (Cisco, 2008). 
The failure to create security policies on the one hand is a major stumbling block 
(Cisco, 2008) and on the other hand, organisations are still at risk because their 
information security policies are not followed by their employees (Siponen et al., 
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2009). One of the reasons is ineffective education of employees with regards to 
security and, therefore today, security awareness forms an important part of 
information security governance because relying on the traditional adhoc 
approaches to security is not enough (Rhee et al., 2012).  
Data leakage is not a new threat but one that persistently plagues organisations and 
in order to minimise the mistakes of employees, IS management should ensure that 
they are educated. Technological advances such as BYOD introduces new ways of 
data being leaked as well as other security implications which are discussed under 
the heading “Business implications of mobile devices”. 
5.4.4 AUDIT COMPLIANCE 
Conducting an audit is the prevalent method in practice among the different methods 
of compliance checking (Ghiran & Bresfelean, 2012). The financial and the 
technological side of the organisation are no longer the only aspects that are 
audited, the security aspects of information such as the security policies, procedures 
and security controls are audited since it seems like a futile exercise to audit an 
organisations financial accounts without verifying that the information is adequately 
and appropriately secured (Vroom & Von Solms, 2004). If the systems maintaining 
the data are not secure, it’s very hard to signoff the validity of the data (Von Solms, 
2006). A common understanding of security policies and practices as well as an 
inconsistency in the application of security controls as a result of audit and 
compliance reporting requests have been identified by Booker (2006) as the main 
problems organisations face when managing governance. Most times the response 
to these audit requests is reactive which means security controls are applied on an 
adhoc basis (Booker, 2006) in response to a bad audit or incident (Anderson, 2003), 
therefore, a planned approach is essential (Booker, 2006).  
 
Humphreys (2008) states that a continuous cycle of improvement is required to 
ensure that information security is effectively established, implemented, monitored, 
reviewed and maintained, done as part of the internal audit which is seen to be an 
essential part of the overall process of governance and risk management. Lots of 
research can be found on each of the topics of governance, risk management and 
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compliance seperately but these should be viewed in an integrated manner 
according to Racz, Weippl and Seufert (as cited in Ghiran & Bresfelean, 2012). 
5.5 IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
5.5.1 INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME 
In order for security governance to exist, something must exist to be governed such 
as a security management programme which is a collection of the controls or core 
components such as risk management, information security policies, procedures, 
guidelines, standards, security education, security organisation and information 
classification that an organisation must have in place (Harris, 2007). An information 
security programme has been suggested as a risk mitigation method that can be 
used by organisations (Williams & Andersen, 2001), the goal of which is to protect 
the company’s information and assets. Security governance ensures that the 
strategic needs of the business are adequately met by the security programme 
(McMillan & Scholtz, 2010). 
The start of such a programme requires enterprise management to identify the scope 
and the risks that the organisation faces (Moulton & Coles, 2003). Harris (2007) 
describes a top-down approach to an information security programme where top 
management initiates, supports and gives direction to the information security 
programme whereas a bottom-up approach is a situation where top management is 
not involved and the IT department develops the security programme. The bottom-up 
approach is doomed to fail according to this best practice because the people 
responsible for protecting the company’s assets are not involved and are not driving 
the information security programme.  
 
Once the risks are identified the idea is to follow a process that enables the 
management of the risks identified (Moulton & Coles, 2003). The process 
recommended by Harris (2007) is referred to as being circular which starts with an 
assessment of the risks to identify the possible damage and potential loss that the 
organisation could undergo if any of the threats materialised. This enables 
management to develop the applicable policies and construct a budget in order to 
protect the organisation by directing the security activities.  
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This is followed by the systems involved being monitored and evaluated. Williams 
and Andersen (2001) state that the infrastructure and environment needs to be 
continuously monitored and tested for vulnerabilities referred to as “test and patch” 
because of the speed with which risks emerge. Von Solms (2005b) states that 
traditionally these types of activities have been regarded as information security 
operational management which created the misconception that it is a technical job. 
Some of the activities mentioned are: 
• Installing and updating anti-virus software  
• Firewall management with regards to connecting workstations to the internet 
• Configuring and updating security settings of servers and workstations and 
several others. 
This image has, however, changed because the protection of information against 
threats leading to wrongful disclosure, alteration or loss requires both technical and 
non-technical safeguards (Von Solms, 2005b). A mixture of evolving policies, 
improved defences and security fixes are required to respond to these risks 
(Williams & Andersen, 2001).  
 
This is then followed by an awareness campaign to make everyone understand the 
issues which results in everyone working towards the same security goals and lastly 
the defined risks are addressed by implementing policies and controls. The cycle 
starts again which means that the security environment is constantly evaluated and 
monitored (Harris, 2007). An aspect which has not been mentioned as part of this 
process is that of compliance which has been discussed and identified earlier as an 
important part of information security governance. Von Solms (2005b) confirms that 
compliance was never considered a part of information security management 
traditionally but over the last couple years the role of information security 
management has changed significantly. In light of this, compliance needs to be taken 
into consideration as part of the information security management programme since 
it is part of information security governance. 
 
The following section discusses using a framework to guide the implementation of an 





An information security governance programme can be successfully implemented by 
adopting best practices (Williams & Andersen, 2001). Von Solms (2005a) states that 
companies are realising that rather than trying to establish an information security 
governance environment on an adhoc basis, it is preferable to follow an 
internationally recognised reference framework. Several resources exist that can be 
used as guidance for information security governance such as: 
 
• Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) which 
aids risk mitigation, strategic alignment maturity assessments and IT value 
delivery (Mataracioglu & Ozkan, 2011; Saetang & Haider, 2011; Raup-
Kounovsky, Canestraro, Pardo, & Hrdinova, 2010; Simonsson et al., 2008; 
Spafford, 2003)  
• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (IT Governance 
Institute, 2008; Dlamini et al., 2009) 
• International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO)/ International Electro 
technical Commission (IEC) 27000 family of security standards (IT 
Governance Institute, 2008) such as ISO17799 (Spafford, 2003; Saint-
Germain, 2005) and ISO27001 (Mataracioglu & Ozkan, 2011) 
• Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) (Harris, 2007) 
Von Solms (2005a) discusses the pros and cons of using both COBIT and ISO17799 
and has stated that they are both good choices for information security governance 
and are complementary and, therefore, when used together can provide benefits to 
the organisation. COBIT enables the integration of information security into a wider 
information technology (IT) framework which means that if the company decides to 
implement the rest of the framework it is available. COBIT, however, focuses on 
what must be done but does not provide detailed guidelines on how it must be done. 
ISO17799 on the other hand, provides more detailed guidance on how things must 
be done but only addresses information security and is not integrated into a wider IT 
governance framework (Von Solms, 2005a). It is the only framework that allows an 
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organisation to become certified by undergoing a third party audit (Saint-Germain, 
2005). 
The IT Governance Institute (2008) recommends that a framework must be 
established and maintained by management to guide the development and 
maintenance of an information security programme in order to achieve effective 
information security governance. Spafford (2003) describes a number of compelling 
reasons why organisations should rather adopt existing standards such as providing 
a well defined structure, they have been developed and assessed over many years 
by many people and organisations, they provide a platform to share knowledge 
between organisations and they make it easier for organisations to be certified 
against a base standard from which improvements can be recommended. 
The next section discusses mobile devices in the workplace, the evolution of mobile 
devices, business implications of mobile devices and some of the risks associated 
with using mobile devices in the workplace. 
5.6 MOBILE DEVICES IN THE WORKPLACE 
The greatest pressure for change with regards to the use of personal devices such 
as smartphones and tablets within the workplace is coming from employees across 
all parts of the business according to managers and senior executives that 
participated in a recent citrix-commissioned global survey (Millard, 2013). Employees 
are allowed to work equally effective wherever they are thereby making employees’ 
lives easier. Work is increasingly being recognised as what you do and no longer a 
place you go to (Millard, 2013). 
5.6.1 EVOLUTION OF MOBILE DEVICES 
Significant technology advances in mobile devices have been witnessed over the 
past two decades. These technology advances spans from the late 1990s and early 
2000s where the personal data assistants (PDAs) came into existence to the 
multifunctional and ubiquitous smartphones of today (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
 
In the early 2000s the first Blackberry smartphone was released which provided 
corporations with benefits such as remote email and calendar access. The idea of 
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24-hour connectivity was established as corporations began providing a large 
percentage of their workforce with network access on their smartphone. This led to 
the release of a number of devices running Android, BlackBerry, Windows Mobile 
and Windows Phone 7 operating systems. Figure 8 depicts this evolution of mobile 




The development of tablet PCs are redefining the concept of smartphones, seen as 
the next evolution in mobile computing, and are being supported by many companies 





The concept of BYOD allows employees to dictate the technology they want to use 
within the company environment and does not follow the process that IT normally 
follows for vetting, monitoring and auditing equipment (Tokuyoshi, 2013). The 
technology advances in mobile devices allows constant access to email, allows 
access and storage of sensitive company information and enables the use of mobile 
business applications which have blurred the lines between home and the office 
(Ernst & Young, 2012).  
 
The old way of working where organisations provide employees with devices to do 
their work is slowly becoming something of the past and can be seen in the growing 
numbers of employees using their own devices within organisations. Figure 9 
illustrates the growth rate of a 10% increase between 2010 and 2011 according to a 
Unisys study conducted by IDC and according to Cisco systems annual visual 
networking index forecast there will be almost 15 billion network connected devices 
such as tablets, notebooks and smartphones by 2015 (Burt, 2011).  
 
FIGURE 9 ‐ UNISYS STUDY CONDUCTED BY IDC (BURT, 2011) 
Users are selecting devices that they find are the most appropriate for their jobs 
based on the usability of these mobile devices which are enabling users to integrate 
their personal and business lives together. Users now have the option to choose 
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between the heavy, boring corporate issued devices or lighter, sleeker personal 
devices.  
 
There is, however, a conflict between the security of the company’s information and 
the usability of mobile devices (Tokuyoshi, 2013). The next section discusses the 
business implications of mobile devices. 
5.6.3 BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS OF MOBILE DEVICES 
The use of mobile devices within the workplace has resulted in a number of 
implications for businesses. An evaluation of the potential risks and benefits of a 
mobile platform strategy is required which keeps the audience in mind since some 
platforms trade-off security in order to achieve usability and simplicity while others 
have inherent secure controls embedded in the device which presents less risks to 
an organisation’s environment (Ernst & Young, 2012).  
5.6.3.1 TANGIBLE BENEFITS 
Organisations such as Stadion Money Management has moved to a BYOD policy 
and plans to eliminate office desktop computers since most of their employees do 
their work such as editing of documents and checking of emails from their own 
mobile devices. The organisation claims that it costs far less to support multiple 
mobile devices than laptops and have reduced their supports costs by 50% for 
employees who travel extensively (Fernandez, 2012). Other authors such as Ashford 
(2012), however, disagrees that reducing costs is not a good enough reason to allow 
employees to use their own devices because it does not outweigh the risk of losing 
sensitive company data. 
Tangible benefits such as staff recruitment, retention and increased productivity have 
been confirmed by surveys conducted across two-thirds of businesses across all 
countries (Millard, 2013). 
 
5.6.3.2 IT DEPARTMENT SUPPORT 
Traditionally, the devices connected to the network have always been owned by the 
organisation and most likely it has been approved, configured and installed by the IT 
people. This can no longer be assumed with the BYOD concept and organisations 
now need access control based on who is connecting to the network but also what 
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and where they are connecting from (Mansfield-Devine, 2012). According to 
Forrester, 33% of users are purchasing personal devices which can specifically be 
used in the work environment to improve productivity with no consideration as to 
whether the IT department can support the devices (Tokuyoshi, 2013). 
5.6.3.3 SECURITY IMPLICATIONS 
Despite the advancement in technology, some businesses are reluctant to move 
towards a more flexible mobile working environment for their employees due to 
security concerns such as allowing employees remote access to the corporate 
network which could potentially lead to corporate data falling into the wrong hands 
and the risks associated with allowing the downloading of applications and 
documents (Millard, 2013). 
Employees using their own devices for work purposes results in many security 
implications such as the possibilities of sensitive data being leaked and the 
infiltration of malware and gaps in the firewall since an employee’s personal device is 
one that is no longer locked down or configured by the company (Mansfield-Devine, 
2012). Green (2007) also warned of virus infection of mobile devices, data theft by 
employees called “podslurping” which is the use of a USB device to copy large 
amounts of data, vulnerabilities regarding bluetooth technology where bluetooth 
devices can be used by an attacker to gain access to data as well as wireless 
technology that introduces another avenue for attackers to access the organisations 
network. 
As devices are becoming popular for both personal and business activity, hackers 
are turning their attention to them. An increase in mobile malware is being reported 
by security researchers. The number of malicious android application package files 
have increased from 139 to 3069 and android malware families have increased from 
10 to 37 between quarter 1 of 2011 and quarter 1 of 2012 (Hart, 2013). 
The organisation’s control over employee devices becomes less which means the 
visibility of adherence to policies and compliance, ownership and usage virtually 
becomes non-existent. Important security features can also be disabled by 
employees since the employee has full control over the device which means the 
devices are exposed to information security threats (Fernandez, 2012). 
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The reality of the employees working in unsuitable locations should also be 
considered since the probability of loss and theft is increased. One way that IS 
management can ensure the security of the organisations information is by 
developing a mobility policy which should state that all devices require a password 
for authentication (Fernandez, 2012) and that the device must have remote-wipe 
software installed so that the data can be wiped from the device should it be lost. 
Chigona, Robertson, & Mimbi (2012) argue that the extent of data loss through 
mobile devices is currently not known and according to the computer crime and 
security survey, proprietary data loss or theft was reported by only 4% of the 
respondents. 
Burt (2011) recommends that users should be required to sign an acceptable use 
agreement which means that if the device is part of a legal dispute the device can be 
seized for an indefinite amount of time. 
Organisations moving to a BYOD practice need to realise that governance is critical 
to its success. For example, Cisco includes stakeholders from business units such 
as legal and human resources on the BYOD steering committee led by their IT 
department. Formal governance is required to define how the organisation can 
strategically move from a managed world to one where IT does not manage every 
technology asset in use in the organisation and where the security perimeter is no 
longer defined (Thomson, 2012). 
5.7 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Some of the themes that were found in the definitions of information security 
governance and in literature have been discussed, and depicted in Figure 10 below. 
How organisations go about implementing information security governance within an 
organisation, specifically within the mobile device environment, has not been 
addressed. There is a lack of literature on information security governance 
implementations within the mobile environment and Kotulic and Clark (2004) agree 
that information security may be one of the most critical areas for research. 
Figure 10 depicts that literature discusses the importance of the support of executive 
management of the information security governance implementation. The 
information security governance implementation consists of both technical and non-
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technical aspects which must be considered in order to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of electronic information. By taking all these aspects into 
consideration threats such as social engineering and identity theft is more likely to be 
prevented than if they were not considered at all. Figure 10 shows a generic view of 
all themes found in literature with regards to information security governance. The 
implementation of information security governance within the context of a mobile 
device environment is currently an unknown area and, therefore, the research 
conducted examined how organisations go about implementing information security 






















































The research design starts by discussing the research question then goes on to 
discuss the research method which explains the background to IS research, the 
research purpose, philosophy, approach, strategy, data collection, data analysis, 
timeframe, sample and ethics. . 
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTION/OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research was to describe and explore the phenomenon of an 
‘information security governance implementation’ in order to gain an understanding 
as to how organisations go about implementing information security governance 
within a mobile device environment. The research question which was answered by 
the research is: 
How do organisations go about implementing information security governance 
within mobile device environments? 
In order to answer the research question, the researcher explored the perceptions of 
the participants on their views of the activities undertaken prior to implementation, 
during the implementation and after the implementation of information security 
governance within the mobile device environment. 
6.2 RESEARCH METHOD 
The research method starts by discussing a short summary of the background to IS 
research, the purpose of the research, then goes on to explain the sections as 






One hundred and fifty five published articles between 1985 and 1989 were examined 
by Orlikowski and Baroudi and found that the IS research community was dominated 
by the positivist paradigm, no critical research work was found and little attention 
was paid to the interpretive paradigm (Chen & Hirschheim, 2004). This trend 
continued as discovered by the study conducted by Chen and Hirschheim (2004) 
who examined 1893 published articles during 1991 and 2001 and found that 81% of 
the published empirical research was positivist. The information systems field was 
dominated by the positivist paradigm until interpretivism emerged in the field 
(Walsham, 1995) and qualitative research became more popular (Chen & 
Hirschheim, 2004). 
In the past according to Baskerville and Myers (as cited in Urquhart, Lehmann, & 
Myers, 2010) the borrowing of theories from other disciplines was a well-known 
characteristic of the information systems research domain. These borrowed theories 
from social science and computer science disciplines (Matavire & Brown, 2013) are 
often valuable but theories could be generated from within the information systems 
discipline itself (Urquhart et al., 2010). This research, therefore, aimed to develop 
theory from within the information security governance domain so that a contribution 




The research was firstly descriptive as it aimed to portray the activities required to 
implement an information security governance initiative (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2007).  
Secondly, the research was exploratory because it aimed to seek new insights into 
the phenomenon of information security governance implementation and to shed 
new light as to how organisations go about implementing information security 
governance within a mobile device environment. An exploratory study is a valuable 
means of finding out what the main concerns are of the stakeholders responsible for 
the information security governance implementation and what impact the outcomes 
of the implementation has on future implementations (Saunders et al., 2007). 
6.2.3 ONTOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
Information system researchers may use a number of philosophical perspectives to 
study information system phenomena (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). According to 
Chua’s classification, three sets of beliefs outline the way the world is seen and 
researched namely, the researchers beliefs about the phenomenon of study, the 
beliefs about the notion of knowledge and lastly, the belief about the relationship 
between the empirical world and knowledge (as cited in Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991).   
 
Ontological beliefs have to do with assumptions about the empirical world. Either the 
empirical world is seen to be objective and independent of humans referred to as 
objectivism. This means that reality exists independently from human experiences, 
which is the belief of positivists or reality is subjective and is created and recreated 
through the actions of humans and therefore, organizations, groups and social 
systems cannot be characterised and measured objectively since they do not exist 
apart from humans, which is the belief of interpretivists and referred to as 
subjectivism (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Saunders et al., 2007). 
 
Positivist, interpretive and critical research philosophies are used to conduct 
information systems research, each of which constitute different worldviews and 





Positivist studies attempt to increase the predictive understanding of phenomena by 
primarily testing theory and assume that a one-to-one relationship between the 
constructs of the researcher’s objects, features or events exists. The researcher 
does not intervene in the phenomenon but takes a neutral role in the investigation 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). The research is based on the notion that the 
researcher is independent, the research is objective and the results are valid, reliable 
and replicable (Pather & Remenyi, 2004). 
 
6.2.3.2 CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
Critical studies attempt to critically evaluate and transform the social reality being 
investigated which fosters an understanding and self-consciousness of the existing 
social conditions. Existing social systems are critiqued and contradictions and 
conflicts are revealed within their structures (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Myers and 
Klein (2011) state that critical research is concerned with social issues with respect 
to the development, use and impact of information technology such as social control, 
freedom, values and power. The transformation of alienating and restrictive social 
conditions is what differentiates the critical research philosophy from positivist and 
interpretive philosophies which are content with the status quo being predicted and 
explained (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Critical researchers declare their interests 
and biases since they believe that bias is inherent in the human condition and 
research is conducted by humans (Pather & Remenyi, 2004). 
 
6.2.3.3 INTERPRETIVE PHILOSOPHY  
Interpretive studies attempt to understand the phenomenon being studied through 
the meanings that participants assign to them (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991) and 
acknowledge that their research problems exist in a social context (Pather & 
Remenyi, 2004). As people interact with the world around them, people create and 
associate their own subjective and intersubjective meanings (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 
1991). The possibility of an “objective” or “factual” account of events and situations 
are rejected by interpretive studies (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991) and, therefore, 
numbers and statistical tests may not necessarily be the most appropriate way of 
understanding the actions of social actors (Pather & Remenyi, 2004). Instead a 
relativistic, shared understanding of the phenomenon being studied is sought. The 
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intention is to understand the deeper structure of the phenomenon so that other 
settings may be informed (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). Deep insights into the 
information systems phenomenon being studied may be produced since an 
interpretive study aids the researchers understanding of human thought and action in 
social and organizational contexts (Klein & Myers, 1999). 
 
The philosophy of the research adopted was interpretive as the aim of the 
researcher was to understand people’s perceptions on the phenomenon of 
information security governance implementation and also how the information 
security governance that was implemented impacted on other implementations. The 
researcher needed to understand the viewpoints of the various participants by 
adopting an empathetic stance (Saunders et al., 2007) which enabled the researcher 
to produce deep insights into the information security governance implementation 
phenomena by gaining an understanding of the participants’ thoughts and actions 
(Klein & Myers, 1999).  
6.2.4 RESEARCH APPROACH  
The researcher used a mixed approach, deductive and inductive; by using a 
conceptual framework developed from the literature as a sensitising device and then 
developed theory that addressed the phenomenon of “information security 
governance implementation”. 
A deductive approach means that theories or concepts are identified in literature 
which will be used to test data (Saunders et al., 2007) or to guide data collection. 
The intent of the researcher was not to test data but to use existing theories or 
concepts as a sensitising device. This means that the research commenced from a 
theoretical perspective which had some advantages such as providing an initial 
analytical framework and links the research into an existing body of knowledge 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Theoretical sensitivity indicates an awareness of the 
researcher of the subtleties of the meaning of data; it refers to a personal quality of 
the researcher. The researcher has insight and is able give meaning to data, is 
capable of separating pertinent information from that which isn’t because of the 
researcher’s capacity to understand. A number of sources can provide the 
researcher with theoretical sensitivity such as literature, professional experience, 
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personal experience and the analytic process itself. All these provide a rich 
background of information that “sensitises” the researcher to what is going on with 
the phenomenon being studied (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). On the other hand, the 
researcher is aware that knowledge gained from experience and reading, biases, 
patterns of thinking and assumptions can block the researcher from seeing what is 
significant in the data. The researcher made use of techniques such as the use of 
questioning, making comparisons and analysing phrases or sentences to prevent or 
rectify these problems (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
The conceptual framework developed during the literature review as depicted in 
Figure 10 was used as a sensitising device and used to start the data collection and 
analysis process. 
The research followed an inductive approach which means that the data collected 
was explored to develop theory and then related back to the existing literature. An 
inductive approach allowed the researcher to understand the nature of the problem 
by interrogating the participants using semi-structured interviews and gave the 
researcher a feel for what was going on (Saunders et al., 2007).  
6.2.5  RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The research strategy employed needs to be able to answer the research question 
and objectives and, therefore, is guided by the research question, the researcher’s 
philosophical stance and the amount of time and resources available (Saunders et 
al., 2007).  
There are several ways of doing social science research such as experiments, 
history, surveys, analysis of archival documentation, case studies each of which has 
its advantages and disadvantages (Yin, 1994). Experiments are suitable when the 
researcher is able to manipulate behavior such as in a laboratory. Surveys are 
usually associated with a deductive approach and can be used to suggest possible 
reasons for particular relationships. Histories are the preferred strategy when the 
relevant individuals are no longer alive to report and the researcher needs to rely on 
documents and physical artefacts as evidence. Direct observation and interviewing is 




The qualitative strategies, action research, ethnography, grounded theory and case 
studies were considered. Neither, action research nor ethnography was appropriate 
for this research since action research is an iterative process of diagnosing, 
planning, taking action and evaluating (Saunders et al., 2007). This research was not 
intended to introduce change and then evaluate it. On the other hand, ethnography 
involves extended participant observation and the phenomenon is researched within 
the context in which it occurs. This research strategy requires the researcher to be 
immersed in the social world completely over an extended period of time (Saunders 
et al., 2007). The researcher had a time constraint and, therefore, the ethnography 
strategy was not appropriate. The strategy chosen for this research was a grounded 
case study. The reasons for the choosing a grounded case study are discussed in 
the next section which discusses case studies as well as the grounded theory 
methodology. 
6.2.5.1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
A case study “is an examination of a specific phenomenon such as a program, an 
event, a person, a process, an institution or a social group” (Merriam, 1988, p. 10). 
Yin (1994, p. 13) states that the technical definition of a case study is that it “is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident”. Eisenhardt (1989) describes a case study research strategy as 
focusing on single settings and understanding the dynamics present within them and 
has also stated that building theory from case study research can provide a fresh 
perspective on a topic that has already been researched. 
Flyvbjerg (2006) states that one of the misunderstandings with regards to case study 
research is that it cannot contribute to scientific development because one cannot 
generalise from a single case. Merriam (1988) argues that it is possible to enhance 
the generalisation of a case study’s results by providing a detailed description of the 
case study’s context so that readers are able to compare it with their own situation.  
A case study is an appropriate strategy when the research question being posed is a 
“how” or “why” question and the researcher has little control over the events (Yin, 
1994). The research undertaken was an information security governance 
implementation, which is a phenomenon within a real-life context, the researcher had 
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little control over the events and the research question being posed is a “how” 
question. Therefore, undertaking a grounded case study as a research strategy was 
appropriate and was conducted at a Retail organisation where information security 
governance had already been implemented within the mobile device environment. 
This research setting chosen was a rich source of information on the research topic. 
The boundary determined at the beginning of the research was a single case study 
which meant that any concepts which may have emerged and required investigation 
beyond the boundary of the single case may not have been possible. The concepts 
that emerged were investigated from within the single case setting which provided a 
detailed description of the case so that readers of other organisations may compare 
it to their own situation (Merriam, 1998). A grounded case study was, therefore, 
appropriate and the theory generated was grounded from the case data. This 
allowed the researcher to observe and analyse an information security governance 
implementation within the context of its real life using multiple sources to discover 
evidence (Saunders et al., 2007) and gain an in-depth understanding of the problem 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
The intent of the researcher was not to be able to generalise the findings to a 
population but to gain a deep understanding of the structure of the information 
security governance implementation which the researcher believed could be of value 
by informing other settings (Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). The researcher’s aim was 
to try and generalise the findings to “theory” (Yin, 1994) so that the case of the 
information security governance implementation could make a contribution to the 
information systems domain. The applicability of the findings of this case study will in 
the end be left to the reader’s discretion as to whether the findings are useful, 
whether it can be learnt from and whether any of the findings can be applied to the 
reader’s situation (Merriam, 1988). 
A grounded case study enabled theory to be built with the use of procedures and 
techniques of the grounded theory methodology which was popularised by 
Eisenhardt (as cited in Matavire & Brown, 2013). Matavire and Brown (2013) have 
encouraged the use of the grounded theory methodology with other research 
methods in IS research so that a better understanding of the outcomes and the 
process can be developed. The use of the grounded theory methodology also guided 
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the researcher to develop a theory in an attempt to explain the phenomenon of an 
information security governance implementation in a way that it has never been 
articulated before (Pozzebon, Petrini, Bandeira de Mello, & Garreau, 2011). The next 
section discusses the grounded theory methodology. 
6.2.5.2 GROUNDED THEORY METHODOLOGY (GTM) 
Grounded theory (GT) appeared for the first time as a book called “The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory” published in 1967 by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss 
(Duchscher & Morgan, 2004; Goulding, 1998) and is defined as “theory which has 
been systematically obtained through “social” research and is grounded in data” 
(Goulding, 1998, p. 51). A grounded theory represents one that has been discovered 
and developed inductively from the phenomenon being studied (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). 
 
The main purpose of grounded theory methodology is to generate theory and the 
interest in the use of grounded theory in information systems research has increased 
over the past decade (Urquhart et al., 2010). IS researchers are, therefore, able to 
use GTM as a means to build theory relevant to the discipline being researched 
(Matavire & Brown, 2013) when little is already known about the phenomenon or 
secondly to provide a fresh slant on the existing knowledge (Goulding, 1998). 
Despite this distinct purpose, information systems grounded theory studies as well 
as other fields have been criticized for having low levels of theory development since 
many studies have used grounded theory as a coding method only. This use of 
grounded theory is appropriate, in some cases, but is limited since grounded theory 
offers a comprehensive method for the generation of theory (Urquhart et al., 2010). 
This study, therefore, used the grounded theory methodology to generate theory with 
regards to the ‘information security governance implementation’ phenomenon within 
the information systems discipline. Grounded theory was selected since it has been 
used and found to be a suitable method for rigorous theory development in the past 
(Goulielmos, 2004). 
GTM is based on the principle of emergence, constant comparative analysis and 





One of the principles that grounded theory is based on is the principle of emergence. 
The use of a conceptual framework before data is collected and analysed is 
discouraged so that concepts and categories emerge from empirical data that has 
been analysed (Pozzebon et al., 2011). Authors such as McGhee, Marland, and 
Atkinson (2007) have, however, argued that there are a number of reasons why a 
literature review should be conducted before any analysis takes place such as the 
ability to justify the reason for the study, to assess whether grounded theory is 
appropriate, to avoid pitfalls conceptually or methodologically and it allows the 
researcher to have an “open mind” and not an “empty head”. The researcher took 
this stance and, therefore, engaged with literature prior to data collection. 
6.2.5.4 CONSTANT COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The general method of comparative analysis is a major strategy which is 
emphasised for the discovery of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) Firstly, 
the data is contrasted against itself, secondly, against evolving original data and 
thirdly, against existing theoretical and conceptual claims. This facilitates the 
emergence of knowledge (Duchscher & Morgan, 2004). 
6.2.5.5 THEORETICAL SAMPLING 
Theoretical sampling is the process whereby the researcher jointly collects, codes 
and analyses the data and then makes a decision as to what data to collect next and 
where it can be found in order to develop the theory as it emerges from the data 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The research may begin with a few concepts that the 
researcher is aware of before the study is conducted which gives the researcher a 
foothold on the research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The researcher conducted a 
literature review and was aware of concepts or themes with regards to information 
security governance as discussed within the literature review section which were 







Qualitative data was collected since the findings of the research were not arrived at 
by means of statistical procedures or in other words, quantification. The intricate 
details of the phenomenon of information security governance implementation may 
have been difficult to convey with quantitative methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
and, therefore, qualitative data was collected. 
Urquhart et al. (2010) refer to seed concepts which is the start to the process for 
generating grounded theory and these seed concepts can come from a range of 
sources other than data such as ‘lived experiences, hunches or other theories as 




The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews to elicit data. The themes 
found in literature relating to the mobile information security governance 
implementation were used as seed concepts to structure the questions that were 
used for the first interview (Appendix A). Although interviews are regarded as one of 
the most important sources of case study information, some common problems are 
poor or inaccurate articulation, poor recall and bias and therefore the interview data 
will be corroborated with other sources (Yin, 1994). 
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Yin (1994) conveys three principles of data collection namely, the use of multiple 
sources of evidence, creating a case study database and maintaining a chain of 
evidence. 
6.2.6.1 MULTIPLE SOURCES OF EVIDENCE 
A combination of data collection techniques was employed by the researcher such 
as observation, semi-structured interviews as well as company documentation 
analysis (Saunders et al., 2007; Yin, 1994) as depicted in Figure 13.  
The use of different data collection techniques within one study is called triangulation 
to ensure the accuracy of the data (Saunders et al., 2007) which helps to counteract 
the biases of the researcher’s collection and analysis of the case data (Darke, 
Shanks, & Broadbent, 1998) and strengthens the findings of the case study (Yin, 
1994). For example, documents can be used to corroborate evidence from other 
sources, if evidence is contradictory, the researcher has a reason to do further 
enquiry (Yin, 1994).  
An example of a situation that was observed by the researcher can be found in Table 
6 (Change Management). The researcher observed that the team that was expected 
to support the mobile infrastructure environment had a low awareness of the content 
of the mobile device management policy and as a result almost contravened the 
mobile device management policy. This was observed after the implementation 
during conversations with the infrastructure team members.  
The researcher observed, recorded the interviews via audio recording as well as 
took notes to ensure accuracy. The interviewees had the option to turn off the 
recorder at all times. Some of the interviewees were not comfortable with being 
audio recorded; these interviews were recorded via typing or taking manual notes 
during the interviews. 
Numerous interdepartmental documentation such as the mobile device management 
policy, standards, processes, project plan, project scoping questionnaire, user and 
device information, mobile audit program, mobile computing audit report, IT mobility 
risks such as the risk of unsecure and unsupported usage of BlackBerry z10 devices 




An email analysis was conducted for the second implementation between March 
2013 and May 2013. The implementation was still in-progress at the time of the data 
collection stage of the research. The researcher used her discretion as to the best 
data collection method for the second implementation and since a case study allows 
for multiple sources of evidence, decided that an email analysis would suffice to 
triangulate the researcher’s observations and conversations with the various 





Yin (1994) suggests that a case study database may increase the reliability of the 
case study conducted since the evidence can be reviewed and is not limited to the 
written report. The researcher has therefore developed a formal, presentable 
database in which evidence such as case study documents, the time and place of 
interviews are all organised, categorised and available for access at a later stage. 
Table 1 is an extract of the case database. 
TABLE 1 ‐ CASE DATABASE 
















In an attempt to increase the reliability of the information in a case study, according 
to Yin (1994) a chain of evidence needs to be maintained. This principle allows the 
reader of the case study to follow evidence from the initial research question to the 
case study conclusion. For example, this means that the conclusion of the case 
study report should reference specific portions of the case study database such as 
interviews or documents and indicate the circumstances under which the evidence 
was collected. These circumstances should be consistent with the specific 
procedures followed which should show that the data collection has indeed followed 
the specified procedures. The researcher has attempted to maintain a chain of 
evidence so that clear cross-referencing to methodological procedures and evidence 
takes place (Yin, 2004). 
6.2.7 DATA ANALYSIS 
The data was transcribed immediately after each interview so that analysis could 
take place since data collection and data analysis according to the grounded theory 
method is carried out concurrently (Pozzebon et al., 2011) which increases the 
researcher’s sensitivity to the concepts, their meanings and relationships (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Data is analysed as it is collected (Pozzebon et al., 2011). This 
principle of constantly comparing means that as the data is collected it is constantly 
compared with concepts and categories being used which means that the theory that 
emerges is grounded in that data (Saunders et al., 2007).  
Strauss and Corbin (as cited in Pozzebon et al., 2011) suggest three types of coding 
namely open coding which allows for the generation of concepts and categories, 
axial coding uses relationships to link categories to its subcategories and lastly, 
selective coding is searching through the categories that have been developed for a 








Open coding pertains to the naming and categorising of the phenomenon by 
breaking down the data into discrete parts. These parts are compared for similarities 
and differences and leads to questions being asked of the phenomenon as reflected 
in the data which allows the researcher to question her own assumptions about the 
phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This was the researcher’s first step in the 
analysis of the data. The researcher broke down paragraphs, observations, 
sentences, ideas and events conceptually. These concepts were then grouped into 
categories which became the basis for theoretical sampling, meaning that the 
categories informed the focus in the next interview (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
6.2.7.2 AXIAL CODING 
Once the categories were established, connections between the categories and sub-
categories were made to establish main categories. The focus of the category is on 
the conditions that give rise to the concept (the context), the action which handles it 
(strategy) and what happens as a result of those actions (consequences). The 
researcher alternated between open and axial coding during analysis (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). During axial coding sub-categories are linked to categories through 
the paradigm model displayed as: 
“(A) CAUSAL CONDITIONS -> (B) PHENOMENON -> (C) CONTEXT -> (D) 
INTERVENING CONDITIONS -> (E) ACTION/INTERACTION STRATEGIES -> (F) 
CONSEQUENCES”  (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 99).  
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) the paradigm model will enable the 
researcher to systematically think about the data and to relate them in complex ways 
otherwise the researcher’s grounded theory will lack precision and density. 
During the research undertaken, the researcher attempted to understand the pre-
implementation motives and activities (causal conditions), describe the actions and 
interactions of the information security governance implementation (phenomenon) 
and what the results of the information security governance implementation were 
(consequences). The researcher found that initially the easiest way to do this was by 
means of a diagram showing the relationships at a descriptive level. This was initially 




The basis for selective coding has now been developed in axial coding. The 
integration of materials is not that much different from axial coding, it’s just done at a 
higher level of abstraction. A movement from description to conceptualisation occurs, 
the core category is related to other categories by means of the paradigm model, the 
relationships are validated, patterns and connections are uncovered, and categories 
are grouped according to properties discovered in accordance with the patterns. 
Lastly, the theory is validated against the data which completes the grounding of the 
theory in data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). 
Figure 14 illustrates the movement from data in the empirical field to the abstraction 
field where possible concepts and categories are identified (Pozzebon et al., 2011). 
These coding methods are specific to the evolved grounded theory approach which 
can be used in the mixed method approach (grounded case study) according to the 












Longitudinal research observes events and people over time and has the capacity to 
study change and development whereas cross sectional studies a particular 
phenomenon at a particular time (Saunders et al., 2007). 
The research undertaken was cross sectional as the phenomenon of information 
security governance implementation was studied over a short period of time as a 
result of the time constraints imposed by the academic course undertaken (Saunders 
et al., 2007). The first interview took place in March 2013, the final analysis was 
completed in December 2013 at which point the final write-up of this dissertation 
continued. 
6.2.9 SAMPLE  
This section discusses the sample selection and the participants of the research. 
6.2.9.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The sample selection followed the process of theoretical sampling. Data was 
collected dynamically, guided by the process of theoretical sampling which means 
that once data has been collected and analysed, the researcher decided based on 
the analyses which additional data should be collected and analysed (Pozzebon et 
al., 2011). This process of theoretical sampling continued until the data collected no 
longer revealed new data relevant to a particular category. The categories at this 
stage were well developed and understood by the researcher as well as the 
relationships between categories. Once this happened it meant that theoretical 
saturation had been reached (Saunders et al., 2007). 
The first implementation analysed followed theoretical sampling whereas, an email 
analysis of the second implementation was conducted. Since the research strategy 
was a grounded case study, multiple sources of evidence were allowed. Emails were 







There were two units of analysis (two implementations) within the case study which 
were analysed. This section discusses the case study backgrounds for both 
implementations and then goes onto discuss the participants of both 
implementations. 
6.2.9.2.1 CASE STUDY BACKGROUND FOR FIRST IMPLEMENTATION 
The research was conducted at a Retail organisation in 2013. Information security 
governance within the mobile device environment was intended to be implemented 
as part of the organisation’s IT strategy but was expedited due to an impending 
mobility audit which used a best practice audit program to guide the audit. 
Information security governance was implemented in the mobile device management 
environment in 2012 and used the SAP Rapid Deployment Solution, which is a pre-
configured guide, to conduct the implementation. 
Prior to the implementation, employees had access to their company email on their 
personal mobile devices without any security controls in place (1.1.6). As a result, 
mobility became an item on the audit plan for the following reasons: 
• the advancement in terms of technology within the industry,  
• the increasing number of personal devices accessing company information 
• the risks associated with mobile devices (1.2.1). 
The risks associated with mobile devices are: 
• the potential loss and leakage of confidential company information (1.2.3) and  
• unauthorised access (1.2.7). 
The project launched a tool that enforced the necessary controls to ensure that the 
company information accessed on mobile devices was protected (1.2.27; 1.1.20). 
The goals and objectives of the implementation were to: 
• set the minimum security levels for mobile devices (1.3.30) such as pin, 
encryption and remote wipe (1.1.8) 
• comply to internal audit  
• have a timely adoption of mobile device management software  
• have a capability to launch a mobile application deployment platform (1.4.7) 
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• ensure confidentiality of company information accessed on mobile devices 
(1.4.8). 
6.2.9.2.2 FIRST IMPLEMENTATION PARTICIPANTS 
The researcher had an idea as to who the participants were that would be able to 
make a contribution to this research. Usually with other qualitative methods all 
interviews are conducted first and then the transcriptions of the interviews are 
analysed whereas with the grounded theory method, data is analysed as it is 
collected (Pozzebon et al., 2011). The researcher, therefore, did not conduct all 
interviews first but made a decision after the data of each interview was analysed.  
The participants listed below are those who have been interviewed as part of the first 
implementation as they were identified as being able to make a contribution to this 
research. The technical architect was the first interviewee as the researcher was 
aware that he played the role of the project manager and would be a rich source of 
information. The second interviewee was the internal IT audit manager at the 
company since one of the concepts that were identified as part of the first interview 
was the concept of “mobility audit” and the researcher felt the need to understand 
the perspective of the auditor with regards to the information governance 
implementation. The rest of the interviews were initiated in the same manner where 
the concepts identified led to the area of investigation. The aim of the researcher 
was to understand the perceptions of the participants listed with regards to the 
activities required prior, during and after the implementation of information security 
governance. 
• Technical architect 
• IT audit manager 
• Mobility consultant 
• Information security specialist 







Company smartphone devices were not managed within the Information Services 
department but by the company’s Procurement department. The company standard 
device was determined by the Procurement department a number of years ago and 
when employees were due for upgrades, the most logical choice of device was the 
next generation mobile device of the same brand. Unfortunately, due to the fact that 
this smartphone device worked completely different to the older generation device, 
this smartphone device was not compatible with the existing technology 
infrastructure implemented during the first implementation and, therefore, the 
implementation of this new mobile device was initiated. 
6.2.9.2.4 SECOND IMPLEMENTATION PARTICIPANTS 
An email analysis was done as part of the second implementation. Documentation 
analysis was allowed as part of the grounded case study, the researcher regarded 
email communication as documentation. The participants listed below formed part of 
the email analysis. The aim of the researcher was to understand how the information 
security governance that had been implemented as part of the first implementation 
impacted on the second implementation. 
 
• Senior buyer 
• IT manager  
• Technical specialists 
• Technical architect 
• Procurement officers 
• Architecture specialist 
• Enterprise risk and assurance manager 
• Architectures, governance and security manager 
• End users 
• Group risk manager 
• Chief information officer 
 
The analysis of the second implementation aided the researcher’s understanding as 
to what impact the information security governance implemented will have on future 
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or subsequent implementations. This will provide some guidance for other 
organisations with their information security governance initiatives. 
6.2.10 ETHICS 
An introductory letter (Appendix B) using the UCT letterhead requesting permission 
for the research to be conducted at the organisation was provided. A summary 
explaining the intention of the research prior to the interview was provided to the 
stakeholders of implementation one (Appendix C). They were also informed that they 
are not obligated to participate, it was completely voluntary. Written consent was not 
obtained as it was implied by the acceptance of the interview. 
For the email analysis of implementation two, a summary and cover letter was sent 
to all email participants (Appendix D). It was agreed with the email participants that 
the CIO would signoff the completed dissertation before being submitted to UCT to 
ensure that confidential company information, the company name or participant 
names were not used. 
Walsham (2006) discusses three specific domains of practice namely, confidentiality 
and anonymity, working with the organsiation and reporting in the literature and 
offers some practical ways of attempting to resolve ethical issues in these domains. 
The researcher intends following these suggestions as described in the section 
below. 
6.2.10.1 CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY 
The participants that have been interviewed are not indentified by name in any 
written work. Ethical problems may be encountered such as the fact that it may be 
possible for individuals to make an informed guess as to who the particular views 
belong to even though no names have been mentioned. Also when reporting in the 
literature on the views of senior people such as the CEO, it may be possible to guess 
who is being discussed based on the contexual information provided even though 







Many IS interpretive researchers may be faced with the decision as to how to convey 
“bad news” discovered or even whether it should be. The tendancy is to phrase it in 
opportunities rather than problems. Walsham (2006) suggests that a presentation or 
workshop would be easier to convey the “bad news” than a written report. 
6.2.10.3 REPORTING IN THE LITERATURE 
The moral dilemma of truthful reporting against expedient reporting is raised 
because participants do not want their organisation to be portrated in a negative light 
in published works. In a case like this, the researcher will make sure that the article 
is submitted for publication long after the submission of the paper so that any critical 
comments about the organisation are less problematic for the organisation 
(Walsham, 2006). 
7 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The initial information security governance implementation within the mobile device 
environment was analysed first. Afterwards, an email analysis of a second mobile 
device implementation was analysed to understand the impacts that the 
implemented information security governance would have on subsequent 
implementations. 
7.1 IMPLEMENTATION ONE ANALYSIS 
Implementation one refers to the implementation of information security governance 
within the mobile device environment. The goals and objectives of the 
implementation as specified earlier were to: 
• set the minimum security levels for mobile devices (1.3.30) such as pin, 
encryption and remote wipe (1.1.8) 
• comply to internal audit  
• have a timely adoption of mobile device management software  
• have a capability to launch a mobile application deployment platform (1.4.7) 






The drivers of the mobile information security governance implementation were the 
reasons for the implementation taking place. Three sub-categories with 6 concepts 
were identified as shown in Table 3. Each sub-category and concept is discussed 
further and shows how the emerging theory is generated. 
TABLE 2 ‐ DRIVERS OF MOBILE SECURITY GOVERNANCE IMPLEMENTATION 






2 part of the strategy was always to have an MDM, umm but 
as I mentioned earlier, MDM solutions are fairly, at that 
point were immature.  
1.1.19 
So by taking an overall view of mobile device management 
[Company] could therefore comply to audit and at the same 




2 Some other goals and objectives were to have a timely 
adoption of mobile device management software. 
Additional goals were to have a capability to launch or to 
have a mobile application deployment platform for 
[Company] so we could deploy [Company] developed 
applications to smartphones. 
1.4.7 
Those opportunities included applications development 
within the mobile space where services could be offered to 
[Company] users and potentially external user which could 







Risk associated with 
mobile devices 
4 It was initiated because of the risk associated with mobile 
devices and increasing number of users that is using their 
devices accessing company data.  
1.2.1 
From risk within the company, what was happening in 




6 Because of risk of loss of information and leakage of 
confidential information it landed on the audit plan. 
1.2.3 
To ensure that probably any sensitive information does not 
get leaked to the wrong hands, to it’s competitors you can 
say 
1.5.16 






Audit compliance  14 MDM was forced upon us by audit 1.1.1 
It was initiated partly because of internal audit pressures, 
pending audit against our environment. Our audit 
department from various sources determined that mobility 
was a risk and they would need to pay attention to this area 
within [Company].  
1.4.5 
Audit responsibility 1 responsible for execution of IT audits basically identifying 
the potential audits for the year, to physically do audit, 
report to audit committee on a quarterly basis 
1.2.28 







I don’t know if it was implemented because of audit. 
Because of what’s happening in industry in terms of 
technology and then also risk. Because of risk of loss of 
information and leakage of confidential information it 




From risk within the company, what was happening in 
industry, newsletters, conferences. 
1.2.4 
I would start with policies and procedures and talk to 
people responsible for the process. Identify risk to process 
and link to specific controls. Assess risk in terms of impact 
and likelihood of occurring. The impact assessment part 






The mobile device management solution was part of the company’s mobile strategy 
and was required to apply security controls to all mobile devices accessing company 
information. This implementation was expedited due to the pending mobility audit 
regarding the security of mobile devices. 
7.1.1.1.2 MOBILE APPLICATION PLATFORM 
The implementation of the mobile device management solution was further required 
to fulfil the mobile strategy of providing the company with a mobile application 
development platform from which the company would be able to deploy mobile 
applications to smartphone and tablet devices. 
7.1.1.2 RISKS TO COMPANY INFORMATION 
7.1.1.2.1 RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH MOBILE DEVICES 
A number of sources such as newsletters, conferences and industry information 
raised awareness with regards to the risk associated with mobile devices. There was 
an increase in the number of users accessing company information on their mobile 
devices and there was a need to mitigate these risks. Two types of risks were 
particularly mentioned and discussed further. 
7.1.1.2.2 COMPANY DATA LOSS/LEAKAGE 
The increase in the number of users accessing company information on mobile 
devices that were not protected was a concern due to the possibility of the leakage 
or loss of confidential company information. Concerns such as company information 
being stolen and sent to competitors were raised. 
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“Then again there’s the problem with the contacts, if you have all your organisation’s 
contacts on your device then people can steal your contacts” (1.3.25). 
7.1.1.2.3 UNAUTHORISED ACCESS 
Users that were not authorised to have access to confidential company information 
were raised as a concern. The mobile device management implementation was 
required to ensure that a certain level of confidentiality and assurance was provided 
for employees accessing their company information on their mobile device. 
7.1.1.3 MOBILITY AUDIT  
7.1.1.3.1 AUDIT RESPONSIBILITY 
The Enterprise Risk and Assurance department is responsible for identifying annual 
IT audits, the execution of the audits and the reporting of audit related information. A 
number sources such as information with regards the advancement of technology 
within the industry, conferences and newsletters identified that company information 
stored on mobile devices was a risk and therefore it was selected as an item on the 
audit plan. 
7.1.1.3.2 AUDIT COMPLIANCE 
The concept of audit compliance was highlighted by all employees, except the 
auditor, as one of the main reasons or drivers for the initiation of the mobile 
information security governance implementation.   
Although the mobility audit was a major driver of the implementation, the mobility 
audit was not dependent on the implementation. The mobility audit would have gone 
ahead whether or not the implementation was complete. 
“Even if IS didn’t implement, audit would have gone ahead. They were proactive in 










From an audit perspective, as mentioned earlier, company information stored on 
mobile devices was seen as a risk and was, therefore, selected as an audit item on 
the audit plan. A relationship has therefore been identified and discussed below. 
7.1.1.4.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘MOBILITY AUDIT’ AND ‘RISKS TO COMPANY 
INFORMATION’ 
A relationship between the sub-categories ‘Risks to company information’ and 
‘Mobility audit’ was identified. The evidence of the relationship is highlighted in 
Figure 15 below; showing that from an audit perspective the main concern was to 
mitigate the risks to company information. 
“I don’t know if it was implemented because of audit. Because of what’s happening in 
industry in terms of technology and then also risk. Because of risk of loss of 






‘Risks to company information’ initiates the ‘Mobility audit’. 
7.1.1.5 EMERGING THEORY IN‐PROGRESS 
The discussion with regards to the drivers of mobile device management 
implementation including the relationship identified is depicted in Figure 16 below 





























In an attempt to provide a secure environment for the company, the Information 
Services department plans various initiatives relating to their strategies and the 
Enterprise Risk and Assurance department in a similar fashion identifies areas that 
may pose as a risk to company information. 
Evidence of this can be found in table 4 below. 
7.1.2.1 PROTECT COMPANY INFORMATION 
TABLE 3 ‐ PROTECT COMPANY INFORMATION 
















... the person above them understands the strategic intent 
of what’s happening so that it was to provide a secure 
environment for the company ... 
1.1.20 
the goals and objectives were to set the minimum security 
levels for devices that umm were interacting with the email 
because that was the first access to corporate data that 
mobile devices had 
1.3.30 
... there are controls in place. We are trying to secure our 
information 
1.1.20 
There were business reasons around securing data, 
knowing which devices were connecting, knowing who 
umm, the capabilities were, we had to have encryption, pin 
and I forget the 3rd one. 
1.1.8 
Pin, encryption, remote wipe, device must be compatible 
with MDM software 
MDM 
Policy 
The project was basically to launch a tool with the relevant 
controls to ensure that the data is protected on mobile 




Ultimately, it doesn’t matter whether the drivers of the implementation are viewed 
from the mobility strategy perspective or the audit perspective because they both 
have a common goal which is to protect the company’s information as depicted in 
Figure 17.  
“audit said that they were going to do a mobility audit, umm, at the same time so who 
















The mobile information security governance implementation consists of 7 sub-
categories (time pressure, team diversity, governance artefact development, change 
management, device education adequacy, communication extent, and stakeholder 
involvement) as shown in Table 5 and Table 6 below. 
TABLE 4 ‐ MOBILE INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE IMPLEMENTATION 
Sub-category Concepts Incidents Supporting evidence Source
Time pressure Time pressure 9 there was  a limited time before the audit happened 1.3.23 
Those things should be decided up front and should 
be implemented from the onset, not as an after 
thought, because then you make somebody use to a 
system and then you just change it. It kind of makes it 
seem like it was just a rushed implementation 
1.5.14 
We were very constrained by the time that we needed 
to implement.  
1.4.24 
The dates of the audit was the big driver because we 
wanted to comply with the audit. 
1.4.9 
The implementation was expedited, we could have 
communicated to internal IS staff better 
1.4.25b 
Having more time could have enabled us to have a 
more complete communication plan. Also, it could 
have allowed more indepth analysis of other 
technologies and vendors. 
1.4.25 
we have different types of packages how we 
implement things so what [Company] chose to do was 
to do it the quickest way 
1.3.31 
The choice of solution had been expedited by 
management in order to meet the internal audit that 
was due. They wanted to have a solution in place to 
meet the audit that was about to take place. 
1.4.11 















Team diversity Team diversity 3 as the technology person, well i became the project 
manager for the implementation and i got a change 
manager who didn’t come to the party. Umm, I had a 
technical team, I had SAP doing the implementation 
themselves and we were through their Rapid 
Acceleration programme, something like that, umm, 
which they have a methodology to implement umm 
Afaria umm. I had the policies and governance people 
to assist on that side 
1.1.28 
We knew that umm doing it with the required 
stakeholders umm would create, would be the fastest 
way to get it in. I took a lot of heat, umm from a lot of 
people 
1.1.10 
What we find with a lot of projects, the more people 
you get involved, the slower the project goes. We 







4 Mobile device management policy 
Mobile device management software 
Mobile device management processes 




MDM Policy MDM policy is one of the more stringently managed 
policies within [Company]. It has a much higher 
visibility within IS. As far as the approvals are 
concerned, it needs to be approved by a core set of 
individuals which is over and above our standard 
information security policies. 
1.4.17 
MDM process There’s been communication about MDM, it’s been 
integrated into the service desk, users are aware of 





The implementation had a limited amount of time within which to complete since one 
of the drivers of the implementation was to comply with the upcoming mobility audit. 
One of the ways to alleviate the time pressure was to have a dedicated team as 
discussed below. 
7.1.3.2 TEAM DIVERSITY 
As a result of the time pressure being experienced, it was felt that the quickest way 
to complete the implementation before the mobility audit was to have a small 
dedicated team since it was believed that this would speed up the implementation 
process. This led to the exclusion of important stakeholders such as those who 
would ultimately be responsible for supporting the infrastructure. A bigger team of 
people would probably not have made a difference but a more diverse group of 
people, which included the infrastructure support people, would most likely have 
65 
 
contributed to a more successful implementation. Figure 20 highlights that a lack of 
‘Team diversity’ had a negative impact on ‘Stakeholder involvement’. 
The relationship between these two concepts is shown in Figure 18 with the 
supporting evidence in the next section. 
7.1.3.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘TIME PRESSURE’ AND ‘TEAM DIVERSITY’ 
The relationship between the sub-categories ‘Time pressure’ and ‘Team diversity’ 
has been identified with the quotes below and depicted in Figure 18. 
“We knew that umm doing it with the required stakeholders umm would create, 
would be the fastest way to get it in.” (1.1.10) 
“What we find with a lot of projects, the more people you get involved, the slower the 





‘Time pressure’ has a negative impact on ‘Team diversity’. 
7.1.3.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘TIME PRESSURE’ AND ‘MOBILITY AUDIT’ 
The completion date of the implementation was driven by the date that the mobility 
audit was taking place. The relationship between the sub-categories ‘Time pressure’ 
and ‘Mobility audit’ has been identified with the quotes below and depicted in Figure 
19. 
“there was  a limited time before the audit happened.” (1.3.23) 
“The dates of the audit was the big driver because we wanted to comply with the 
audit.” (1.4.9) 
“The choice of solution had been expedited by management in order to meet the 
internal audit that was due. They wanted to have a solution in place to meet the audit 
that was about to take place.” (1.4.11) 
 











As part of the mobile information security governance implementation, a number of 
artefacts were developed or can be seen as outputs of the implementation such as 
the: 
• Mobile device management policy 
• Mobile device management software 
• Mobile device management standards 
• Mobile device management processes 
7.1.3.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘GOVERNANCE ARTEFACT DEVELOPMENT’ AND 
‘MOBILITY AUDIT’ 
The starting point of the mobility audit was the governance artefacts used to govern 
the mobile device environment. The governance artefacts, therefore, needed to be in 
place before the audit took place. The policies, procedures and processes were 
reviewed as part of the mobility audit so that any risks within the mobile device 
management area would be identified and assessed. Evidence of this can be seen in 
the below quote and depicted in Figure 19: 
 
“I would start with policies and procedures and talk to people responsible for the 
process. Identify risk to process and link to specific controls. Assess risk in terms of 
impact and likelihood of occurring. The impact assessment part looks at risk with 
considering control. Likelihood considers controls” (1.2.23). 
 


















The theory is further elaborated as shown in Figure 19 below with the categories, 












The data incidents of concepts within the category of change management indicate 
that not a lot of thought went into the aspect of change management, device 
education and communication during the implementation. The evidence of these 
concepts are shown below in Table 6 and each concept is further described in the 
below section. 
TABLE 5 ‐ CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
Sub-category Concepts Incidents Supporting evidence Source
Change 
management 
Change management 3 The issues came around the change management 
and I don’t know what we can change for it to get 
better because it was so heated. 
1.1.16 
as the technology person, well i became the project 
manager for the implementation and i got a change 
manager who didn’t come to the party.  
1.1.28 
the change management process that has to go in 





































adequacy like for me personally, even like this whole threat of 
malware it doesn’t have impact on me, I don’t 
understand why I need to have a umm anti-virus on 
my mobile device right so, if there was more 
education around it then maybe I would understand. 
The same thing with MDM, it has a bigger impact 
because of the data involved and because it’s 
private data but there’s not a lot of communication.  
1.3.26 
I think it’s an education part, I mean, it is IS’s 
responsibility to educate the users about information 
security, so they tell them these are the devices if 
you want to access your corporate email on 
devices, these are the devices we will allow you to 
do and then IS is the organisation that holds this so 
therefore they should push this information out to 
the general public so that they know oh if I go and 
buy a windows phone, I’m not gonna get my email, 
do I still want it? 
1.3.14 
User behaviour 5 a big part of mobile information security is also the 
end user behaviour right whether they leave their 
device unattended at the airport while they browsing 
all those sort of things and that should be part of the 
change management or  the education that is rolled 
out to the users when we dealing with MDM and for 
me that wasn’t done so I do think that’s a big part 
that’s missing  
1.3.17 
when I think about governance also I think a lot 
comes down to the individual himself and to ensure 
that he is responsible for who he shares his 
information with if he deals with any sensitive 
information 
1.5.18 
the human behaviour the users behaviour still has a 
very big impact in that, I think that’s also part of the 
process and part of the knowledge that must be 
delivered to the end users 
1.3.29 
We included it in our induction process but I don’t 
think it’s sufficient. People give their laptops to the 
kids with all the information on it. We don’t have a 
mature culture. We have fancy tools but business is 
not on board yet. 
1.2.25 
It comes down to [Company] behaviours and users 
need to comply to the policy although there might 
not be a technology control to enforce it.  Not 
possible to enforce everything in policy so we rely 




Communication to end 
users 
10 So, you don’t think that people actually understand 
why we did. No, not at all 
1.3.18 
i think that just the knowledge to the end users, the 
end users were never really taken into account 
1.3.28 
They also did not understand what we could access 
that wasn’t clearly communicated to them as to 
where the boundaries were 
1.5.10 
I think more consultation with the business would 
have been better, would have made the acceptance 
of the application smooth instead of people feel that 
they were forced to do this. 
1.5.11 
I think just the communication to the users. 1.5.13 
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More and better communication with the business, 
informing them about the reason and importance of 
information security and why it is being rolled out . 
1.2.19 
It was affecting the majority of users that were 
accessing [Company]’s information, there was a lot 
of resistance. Having more time could have enabled 
us to have a more complete communication plan. 
1.4.25 
there was no communication to the end user 1.3.16 
if there was more education around it then maybe I 
would understand. The same thing with MDM, it has 
a bigger impact because of the data involved and 
because it’s private data but there’s not a lot of 
communication. In all companies I’ve seen that’s 
installed it there’s not a lot of information around 
why this thing has to be installed and must have a 
password. It’s just seen as another process that 
business want 
1.3.26 
because none of this information was given to the 
user, they didn’t actually know so it was complaints, 
and lots of umm, scary rumours running around. If 
you install Afaria it will wipe your phone, once it 




2 SAP Basis team were not aware of policy 
statements regarding the collection of data. Low 
awareness of policy within the IS team. 
Observation
The implementation was expedited, we could have 




  6 One thing that bothered me with the entire 
implementation was that there was no discussion. I 
was just told that this was the product that we are 
going to be using and that I was going to be looking 
after it. I’d be the last point of call from [Company] if 
anything should go wrong, whether it was server, 
policy. 
1.5.2 
I would have loved to be involved from the start so I 
could see what a competitor or a different product 
has to offer. I would like to know why we chose 
Afaria. What made Afaria the choice. When from 
what I could see, that the system was not the best 
system out there or it wasn’t the easiest 
implementation, let’s put it like that.  
1.5.15 
maybe it must be brought together a bit more 
because when we initially did the  installation we 
never involved Basis, they were never a part of it.  
1.3.22a 
Then we needed to install a dev server and that’s 
when Basis actually got involved discussions 
around who owns what. That never happened in the 
initial implementation. Again it was the whole siloed 
approach, we just dealt with one stakeholder 
1.3.22 
it seemed like the implementation was a bit siloed 
that it was implemented, this is what we doing and 
we don’t care about the rest of the organisation, we 




Initially no, umm when there were changes I was 
explained the policies. When I initially spoke to the 
third party contractor I asked him if [Company] ever 
need to create, would I need to create more policies 
and I was told no. So, the policies that were setup 
were given to me with the system. Then I wanted to 
know, would we ever need to develop our own 
policies, would I need to learn how to  create 




The mobile device management implementation consisted of a small dedicated team 
of people which included a change manager. The data indicates that the lack of 
change management could be attributed to the change manager who was assigned 
to the implementation. Since the characteristics of a good change manager was not 
the focus of this research, the relationship between the lack of ‘Change 
management’ and the ‘change manager’ was not further investigated. The category 
of ‘Change management’ was further analysed according to the various sub-
categories identified. 
7.1.3.8.2 DEVICE EDUCATION ADEQUACY 
The sub-category ‘Device education adequacy’ consists of two concepts namely, 
‘Device education’ and ‘User behaviour’.  
7.1.3.8.2.1 DEVICE EDUCATION 
The mobile device management software implemented supported specific mobile 
device types based on the operating system installed on the device. From a 
technology perspective one of the biggest challenges faced, was device 
fragmentation which refers to the different types of mobile devices that were 
available to users on the market. This will remain an ongoing problem for 
organisations due to technology advancement. 
“..fragmentation, the biggest thing is fragmentation.” (1.3.32) 
The mobile device management software did not support all mobile device types. It 
was, therefore, important that the employees at the company who required access to 
their company information using their mobile device were educated on which devices 
or operating systems would be supported.  
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“I think it’s an education part, I mean, it is IS’s responsibility to educate the users 
about information security, so they tell them these are the devices if you want to 
access your corporate email on devices, these are the devices we will allow you to 
do and then IS is the organisation that holds this so therefore they should push this 
information out to the general public so that they know oh if I go and buy a windows 
phone, I’m not gonna get my email, do I still want it?”? (1.3.14) 
The education regarding the supported mobile devices or operating systems was not 
done as part of the implementation which resulted in consequences for the 
employees which are discussed later. If it had been done, the user’s expectation 
would have been managed better. 
“the user’s expectation is that it should work with everything” (1.3.12) 
7.1.3.8.2.2 USER BEHAVIOUR 
The second concept identified as part of the sub-category ‘Device education 
adequacy’ was ‘User behaviour’. The company has no control over the behaviour of 
the employees. The company entrusts its employees with company assets, whether 
it is hardware such as devices or soft copies of information that resides on those 
devices, whether they are company-owned or personal. Employees may not be 
aware of the dangers of leaving their devices unattended while at the airport or 
simply sharing sensitive company information with individuals that should not have 
access to the information provided. One way of familiarising employees with the 
dangers relating to their behaviour and the information security of company assets is 
through education. Education with regards to user behaviour was not done as part of 
the implementation and is an important factor to consider since it is not possible to 
enforce everything in policy. The behaviour of employees is relied on. 
“...should be part of the change management or the education that is rolled out to the 
users when we dealing with MDM and for me that wasn’t done so I do think that’s a 







‘Communication extent’ had the most number of data incidents compared to the 
other sub-categories within ‘Mobile information security governance implementation’. 
The number of incidents for ‘Communication to the end user’ outweighed the number 
of incidents for ‘Communication to technical employees’. 
7.1.3.8.3.1 COMMUNICATION TO END USER 
A more robust communication plan would have made the transition for users easier. 
Due to the lack of communication, employees had a low understanding of what the 
implementation was trying to achieve. The reasons and importance of information 
security must be communicated to the end user. If this was done, there most 
probably would have been less resistance and a smoother acceptance of the 
software.  
7.1.3.8.3.2 COMMUNICATION TO TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES 
Some of the technical employees were not aware of the contents of the mobile 
device management policy or even that the mobile device management policy 
existed.  
7.1.3.9 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘TIME PRESSURE’ AND ‘COMMUNICATION EXTENT’ 
A relationship was identified between the concept, ‘Time pressure’ and the concept, 
‘Communication extent’, related to ‘Change management’. 
“It was affecting the majority of users that were accessing [Company]’s information, 
there was a lot of resistance. Having more time could have enabled us to have a 
more complete communication plan.”(1.4.25) 
“Time pressure’ negatively impacts on ‘Communication extent’. 
7.1.3.10 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT 
Due to the time pressure which led to a small dedicated team of people, there was a 
lack of stakeholder involvement in the implementation. Important stakeholders 
required to support the infrastructure and application were either not involved at all, 
or were only involved at the end of the implementation and explained that they would 






The relationship between the concept ‘Stakeholder involvement’ and ‘Team diversity’ 
has been identified as follows: 
 “Then we needed to install a dev server and that’s when Basis actually got involved 
discussions around who owns what. That never happened in the initial 
implementation. Again it was the whole siloed approach, we just dealt with one 
stakeholder” (1.3.22) 
Lack of ‘Team diversity’ negatively impacts on ‘Stakeholder involvement’. 
Figure 20 shows an updated version of the emerging theory illustrating the inclusion 
























































The sub-category ‘Employee dissatisfaction’ consists of five concepts as shown in 
Table 7 below. 
TABLE 6 – EMPLOYEE DISSATISFACTION 
Sub-category Concepts Incidents Supporting evidence Source
Employee 
dissatisfaction 
User resistance 7 No, even the CEO didn’t want it on his ipad.  1.2.5 
It was affecting the majority of users that were accessing 
[Company]’s information, there was a lot of resistance.  
1.4.25c 
Initially there were a number of individuals that were not 
receptive to the software  
1.4.13b 
People. they were not very receptive.  1.5.7a 
there were some concerns about [Company] accidently 
wiping their phones 
1.4.13c 
The issues came around the change management and I 
don’t know what we can change for it to get better 
because it was so heated err what we found that umm 
there was a lot of noise initially umm but after 2 weeks it 
disappeared,  
1.1.16 
They don’t understand, they don’t see it as a positive 
step to securing information, it’s a hassle, more work, 




9 The access of users of Nokia devices that were not 
compatible with existing MDM software had to be 
disabled due to an audit finding. Users unhappy 
because it meant that they would have to upgrade their 
devices even though they did have a PIN on their 
device. Devices do not support encryption. 
D1  
Nokia user was unhappy about his access being taken 
away and also with the fact that he had to have an 
alphanumeric pin - (not the proper standard applied); 
Once access was removed, IT had to help with removing 
the PIN from the phone. 
C1  
people were complaining about battery power, that their 
devices were umm, getting run down 
1.3.3 
it drained up their battery 1.1.24b 
it used up their data 1.1.24c 
For one, they didn’t like the extra password 1.5.7c 
we inadvertently collected possibly personal information, 
not on purpose, which we said we would not (1.4.13e) 
1.4.13e 
and we have denied people access / stopped people 
from having access to the information that they 
previously had because their device was not supported 
by our choice of software 
1.4.13 
we have accidently locked a user out of his data where 





2 Not necessarily because we had a lot of business push 
back. It meant a lot more work on their part. They had to 





People are scared that the administrator might make 
changes to the Afaria application and the personal data 
would be exposed. 
1.2.18 
Privacy 4 the complaints that the customers/ users didn’t 
understand what Afaria was doing. They believed that 
Afaria was running all the time, looking at what they 
were doing, looking at their phone calls, reading sms’s, 
looking at what what webpages they were looking at 
1.3.4 
Privacy, umm reduced capability of their phones so I 
think that’s the right way to put it, it drained up their 
battery, it used up their data. 
1.1.24 
Some of the concerns were that [Company] would be 
collecting personal information 
1.4.13a 
if the person above them understands the strategic 
intent of what’s happening so that it was to provide a 
secure environment for the company and all these 
people sort of complained about their personal umm, 
their privacy, once, at the GM level, they were able to 
say well, it doesn’t affect your privacy, there are controls 




4 There political challenges, lets put it that way, err where 
we expected it was going to be err rough thing, a rough 
situation due to the fact that we were telling users that if 
they wanted to connect to our environment, we had to 
have control over their devices.  
1.1.9 
people were unhappy that we had the ability to manage 
and remote wipe their phones.  
1.5.9 
because none of this information was given to the user, 
they didn’t actually know so it was complaints, and lots 
of umm, scary rumours running around. If you install 
Afaria it will wipe your phone, once it installs it, it first 
wipes and then you secure 
1.3.5 
they didn’t like the idea of somebody else being able to 




The change management aspect of an implementation provides an easier transition 
for end users and when it is not done in an effective way or not at all, it leads to a 
number of consequences which need to be dealt with. As a result of the lack of 
change management during the implementation, there were five concepts that were 
highlighted. These are described further.  
7.1.4.1.1 USER RESISTANCE 
Users resisted installing the mobile device management software on their device 
because they were unsure of what the consequences would be. The users did not 
view it as a way of securing the company information; instead they were afraid that 
their data would be accidently wiped from their device. Users did not have an 
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understanding of what the implementation was about or what was trying to be 
achieved. 
7.1.4.1.2 PERSONAL DEVICE AFFECTED 
Once the mobile device management IT system policies were applied to user’s 
devices, there were a number of complaints related to the affects it had on the 
devices. Users were unhappy about being forced to have a password on their device 
and they complained about the fact that their battery life had been affected. Some 
mobile device users that previously had access to their company information on their 
mobile devices were no longer able to access the same information because their 
devices were not compatible with the mobile device management software or the 
devices did not support encryption, which was one of the security controls enforced.  
7.1.4.1.3 PERSONAL DATA LEAKAGE 
Users were afraid that the administrators would have access to their personal data 
on their mobile device or that a small change could be made and, therefore, expose 
personal data stored on the device. To alleviate these concerns the data collected by 
the mobile device management software was documented so that users were aware 
of what data was being collected.  
The mobile device management policy specifically states that any changes to the 
data collected would need to be approved and all employees would be informed and 
would have the opportunity to rather opt-out of having access to company 
information on their mobile device. 
7.1.4.1.4 PRIVACY 
Users did not have an understanding of what the mobile device management 
software was doing to their device and felt that it was an invasion of their privacy. 
Users were under the impression that all their activities whether it was a phone call, 
sms or browsing were being saved and somehow accessible by the administrators. 
7.1.4.1.5 CONTROL OF PERSONAL DEVICE 
Users were unhappy about the technical employees controlling their personal device. 
As a result of the lack of communication, users were under the wrong impression as 





The relationship between ‘Employee dissatisfaction’ and ‘Change management has 
been identified as follows: 
“..because none of this information was given to the user, they didn’t actually know 
so it was complaints, and lots of umm, scary rumours running around. If you install 
[software] it will wipe your phone, once it installs it, it first wipes and then you secure” 
(1.3.5) 
“The issues came around the change management” (1.1.16) 
Inadequate ‘Change management’ aggravates ‘Employee dissatisfaction’. 



























































As a result of the mobile information security governance implementation, a number 
of governance artefacts were developed which must be adhered to.  Compliance to 
these artefacts was ensured via a number of ways and the following three sub-
categories were identified: ‘Technology compliance’, ‘Governance artefact 
compliance’ and ‘Audit compliance’ as shown in Table 8.  These are discussed in 










6 They are forced to comply. Afaria perspective – they can’t 
switch off the policy. Not sure from a BlackBerry 
perspective. 
1.2.17 
They don’t have a choice, but the user still needs to inform 
the Helpdesk if the device gets stolen so it can be wiped.  
1.2.14 
we are ensuring compliance through technology, We have 
an MDM software that ensure compliance. 
1.4.19 
I think so because users are forced to abide by the 
controls of the policy .  
1.2.26 
I suppose we enforce compliance because they can’t have 
access to the information unless they have Afaria  
1.1.32 
I think people learned to accept that they have to have it. 
Obviously if they had a choice they wouldn’t want it on but 
they had to have it on, so that had to learn to accept it. 
1.5.7 
 people accepted that if they wanted something, if they 














6 We have internal audit that reviews our compliance to 
policy. 
1.4.21 
Poor or unsatisfactory, a repeat audit will be done next 
year. It means there were a number of high risk issues that 
need to be resolved within 0-3 months. 
1.2.10 
For the most part it was a successful implementation. The 
implementation allowed us to meet the audit requirement 
and increased the security around mobile devices and 
therefore this protects [Company] information.  
1.4.23 
just the fact that there no audit findings around any of the 
policies was a feather in your hat 
1.1.31 
with the goals that we set out in the beginning with the risk 








Employees that required access to their company information on their mobile device 
were required to have the mobile device management standards applied to their 
devices. Employees did not have a choice as the standards were applied via a 
system policy. Standards such as a password and encryption were applied to the 
mobile device. Employees that did not agree with these standards, as a result of the 
dissatisfaction concepts discussed, were no longer allowed to have access to their 
company information on their mobile devices. Most users have, however, accepted 
that if they wanted access to their company information on their mobile devices then 
they had to comply. 
7.1.5.2 GOVERNANCE ARTEFACT COMPLIANCE 
Manual interventions by the Architectures and Governance team were sometimes 
required since not everything can be enforced with technology. 
“...there might not be a technology control to enforce it” (1.4.16) 
If necessary, corrective measures were taken to ensure that the governance 
artefacts were complied with. All statements within the mobile device management 
policy cannot be enforced with technology. A manual intervention was required by 
the Architectures and Governance team when infrastructure team members were not 
aware of policy statements regarding the collection of data. Any technical changes 
that resulted in a change to the types of data collected from mobile devices would 
have contravened the mobile device management policy because these changes 
had to be signed off by the CIO.  This observation is highlighted in Table 6.  
7.1.5.3 AUDIT COMPLIANCE 
Internal audit reviews the Information Services department’s compliance to the 
governance artefacts such as the mobile device management policy. This is done 
periodically determined by the Enterprise Risk and Assurance function. An audit 
result of “poor” or “unsatisfactory” means that a repeat audit will be done in the near 








The relationships between ‘Mobile information security governance implementation’, 
‘Ensure compliance’ and ‘Provide secure environment’ have been identified as 
follows: 
“For the most part it was a successful implementation. The implementation allowed 
us to meet the audit requirement and increased the security around mobile devices 
and therefore this protects [Company] information” (1.4.23) 
‘Mobile information security governance implementation’ satisfies ‘Ensure 
compliance’. 
‘Mobile information security governance implementation’ works towards ‘Provide 
secure environment’. 
‘Ensure compliance’ ensures ‘Provides secure environment’. 
Figure 22 illustrates the theory developed from implementation one with all the 
































The second implementation refers to the implementation tasked to include the newly 
chosen company-owned mobile device as a supported mobile device within the 
company’s technology infrastructure. The mobile device management software did 
not support all mobile device types and the newly chosen company-owned mobile 
device was a device that was not compatible with the technology infrastructure 
implemented during the first implementation.  
7.2.1 DRIVERS OF NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION 
The category of “Drivers of new mobile technology implementation” consists three 















































technology” and “Mobile device provision pressure” which are all discussed in further 
detail and supporting evidence shown in Table 9. 
TABLE 8 – DRIVERS OF NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION 






2 Please could you check with [Service Provider] as [GM3's] 
sim card is not activated. It’s giving an error message on 
the phone. 
We are unable to activate email and calendar on the device 
before the sim card is sorted. 
I2E59/AS 
Procurement have the responsibility to manage [Company]-
owned devices and should be the first point of call for users 
in this category.  
I2E16/AM 






11 Did you guys log this work order or who was it from. We 
had PO1 in that Blackberry session and the vendor, not us, 
explained to her In great detail what infrastructure we 
require as well as licenses. Now I’m afraid we need to pull 
out all the stops to get this into our environment. 
I2E1/ITM 
we had a meeting with [FIM] this morning to have the BB 10 
server setup in our current environment. I’m gathering all 
the necessary information from [V] to proceed with this 
requirement.  
I2E1/SB 
Please could you provide the link for the CCP policy. 
Can you provide the reasoning why procurement has not 
revisited the Blackberry decision (with IS input).  
Blackberry has made significant changes to their operating 
model, and current trend is for enterprises is to move off 
blackberry devices. 
I2E5/TA 
Currently 95% of Fortune 500 companies run on a 
BlackBerry® Solution. 
I will be arranging a session for IS with [B], the Enterprise 
Sales Manager from Blackberry at his earliest convenience, 
I think he is down next week.  
I2E5/PO1 
“Currently 95% of Fortune 500 companies run on a 
BlackBerry® Solution.”  This statement is straight out of 
Blackberry marketing material and could be said about any 
cellphone vendor.  
The trend that we are seeing is that enterprises are moving 
away from blackberry. 
Below is an example of blackberry losing market share. 
I2E5/TA 
On my side, I will need the expertise of Mobile at Work, to 
be educated on what the capabilities on the Z10/BDS is in 
order to maximise value add. 
For example, SAP is a business partner of Blackberry and 





”In hindsight, the continuation of the BlackBerry device as a 
company standard device should have been reviewed 
taking all factors into consideration before being 
purchased.” 
As per our previous discussion, Procurement did consult 
with IS, [FIM], in a meeting that we initiated to get approval 
and discuss the possibility of upgrading to the Z10. 
The Z10 was the logical upgrade in the Blackberry range ito 
“upgrading on contract”. 
No Z10 contractual upgrades were authorised by myself, up 
until approval was received from IS to go ahead with a date 
of possible go-live.  
If necessary we could track the IS work orders, systems 
enhancements and communications, in order to proof the 
date of change on the system was way before the actually 
contractual signatures on my side. 
I2E18/PO1
Kindly could we schedule a meeting to discuss the 
Company Cell Phone standard device, Blackberry, which 
was signed off and implement a while back on Policy.  
IT have been advising our Company Cell Phone Users that 
we may procure from a variety of brands i.e iPhone, 
Samsung etc. 
Recalling the logic behind the stance we took on 
implementing a Company standard device; was to eliminate 
the pressure of supporting various devices from an IT 
support as well as Supplier Customer Care & Repair 
Support.  
I2E17/PO1
IS is best positioned to assess and recommend technology 
choices as we consider not only the cost and supportability 
of devices but also the risks associated with secure usage 
of [Company] information in order to preserve its 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
I2E16/AM 
We are not promoting any specific device. All we are saying 
is that there are other devices that are currently compatible 
within the existing [Company] infrastructure, iPhone and 
Samsung devices were used as examples of devices that 







3 Some of us are due for upgrades promptly  I2E16/EU1 
Following up on the Blackberry Z10 progress to be able to 
use the phone. (have it now for 6 mnts and paying the 
contract) .  My current blackberry is not in good shape 
(some of the keys are not working). I am happy even if I can 
just use as a normal phone (but must have my contacts) for 
now until they are able to address the emails issue.  
I2E52/EU5 
Can I please have a progress update on my application. I2E53/EU4 
Power - using 
GM's to get 
work  expedited 
6 Please find attached the PO for the BDS server installation. 
Please expedite the work as the General Managers are 
awaiting connectivity to receive work related emails on their 
mobiles. 
I2E2/SB 
    [GM1] has asked me to run this pass you as IS has 
proclaimed an ERA finding. 
Executives awaiting activation : 
·         8 Company Cell Phone users 
·         CEO 
·         [GM2] 
·         [GM3] 
·         [GM4] 




    I’ve spoken to the Architectures, Governance and Security 
team and we cannot give anyone access to the BlackBerry 
Z10 until the necessary security assessments and related 
work has been completed. 
I have found out about the device in question and currently 
phone calls can be made. The only problem is that new 
emails are not downloading. I have been informed that the 
user has an ipad which could be used for this purpose in 
the meantime as the ipad is configured for international 
roaming. [Desktop support engineer] is avaible tomorrow to 
check the ipad if it is required. Please let me know. 
A note will be going out to the whole company soon with 
regards to the BlackBerry Z10 so that everyone is aware of 
the current status. 
I2E9/AS 
    I am fully aware of the pressure from PO1’s office for 
distributing these devices. I am pretty sure the VIP’s are 
pressing hard for it. But we have to be on top of our game 
before facing those requests. I am sure that if 
communicated successfully and carefully that the VIP’s will 
understand. 
I2E4/TS 
    Further our conversation in your office this afternoon, 
unfortunately, I have received the below comms from IT. 
A request to use your IPAD instead to retrieve mail has 
been instructed. 
I2E11/PO1
Power - using 
ERA to get work 
expedited 
2 Can you please advise as to when security assessments 
will be completed for BB Z10, the users urgently require 
access to their emails.  
I2E11/EM 
I cannot understand as to why IS is promoting Samsung 
devices as it is an Android device that is not protected from 
malware loaded onto these devices. This was discussed at 
yesterday’s AMC meeting. Yu can refer to open audit issue 
on Malware. 
I2E21/EM 
Power - using 
Business users 
to get work  
expedited 
1 [AS] has come back to me to say that there are other 
devices that can be procured such as iPhone or 
Samsung...the Z10 is not supported right now! Please 




Company mobile devices are managed by the Procurement department who liaises 
with business users who require a company-owned mobile device as part of their 
job. The Information Services department provides these business users with access 
to their company information, specifically email and calendar, on their mobile 
devices.  
7.2.1.1.1 DEMAND FOR NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY 
As a result of company mobile devices being managed within the Procurement 
department, the company standard device choice was made by this department. 
Unfortunately, the new generation mobile device which was seen to be the most 
logical choice, given the fact that the company had used this brand of device for a 
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number of years, was not compatible with the existing mobile infrastructure as a 
result of it being a new mobile technology.  
 “Blackberry for a long time has been integrated within our environment” (I2E22/SB) 
The decision in terms of the choice of the company mobile device resided with the 
Procurement department and the Information Services department was unable to 
convince the business to choose a mobile device which already worked within the 
environment. 
“IS is best positioned to assess and recommend technology choices as we consider 
not only the cost and supportability of devices but also the risks associated with 
secure usage of [Company] information in order to preserve its confidentiality, 
integrity and availability.” (I2E16/AM) 
A disconnect existed between the Procurement department, where the responsibility 
of managing company mobile devices resided, and the Information Services 
department, where the technical experts who had the knowledge as to whether the 
device would work in the company’s mobile environment.  
7.2.1.2 MOBILE DEVICE PROVISION PRESSURE 
The Procurement department was under pressure to provide business users with 
mobile devices. Some of these users were due for upgrades and others had faulty 
devices and required urgent replacement devices.  
“Some of us are due for upgrades promptly” (I2E16/EU1) 
Some of the business users such as the general managers had already been 
allocated these new mobile devices which then in turn added pressure to the 
Information Services department to deliver a solution for these new devices.  The 
fact that these users had already been allocated devices was used as a means of 
expediting the work required to introduce the new technology into the existing 
environment. 
“Please expedite the work as the General Managers are awaiting connectivity to 






Evidence of the relationships between ‘Management of company mobile devices’ 
and ‘Demand for new mobile technology’ is as follows: 
“The Z10 was the logical upgrade in the Blackberry range ito “upgrading on contract” 
(I2E18/PO1) 




Evidence of the relationship between ‘Management of company mobile devices’ and 
‘Mobile device provision pressure’ is as follows: 
“Can I please have a progress update on my application” (I2E53/EU4) 




Evidence of the relationship between ‘Demand for new mobile technology’ and 
‘Mobile device provision pressure’ is as follows: 
“have it now for 6 mnts and paying the contract”(I2E52/EU5) 
‘Demand for new mobile technology’ intensifies ‘Mobile device provision pressure’. 
Figure 23 depicts the relationships discussed between all sub-categories of ‘Drivers 





















The category of ‘Drivers of information security governance consideration’ consists 
two sub-categories ‘Risks to company information’ and ‘Governance artefact 
compliance’ which are discussed in further detail and supporting evidence shown in 
Table 10. 
TABLE 9 ‐ DRIVERS OF INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATION 







3 There is an open work order with IS to perform a security 
and risk assessment of this device.  
A security assessment is not a trivial exercise and is done 
to mitigate risks to company information... given the CEO’s 
strategic focus on risk management, I am sure that these 
users will fully understand the importance of ensuring 
[Company] information risks are being properly managed. 
I2E11/AM 
a)Usage of these devices is a risk to the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of [Company's] information as they 
are not secured through our mobile device management 
infrastructure. 
I2D1 
Please could we meet to discuss the risk identified with the 
BlackBerry Z10 and obtain your signatures as acceptance 




2 As this solution poses a risk in terms of data leakage to 
[Company's] information, we are in the process of 
documenting the risk that needs to be signed off before 
access can be given. 
I2E60/AS 
... to accept the risk and responsibility associated with 




4 IS is best positioned to assess and recommend technology 
choices as we consider not only the cost and supportability 
of devices but also the risks associated with secure usage 
of [Company] information in order to preserve its 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  
I2E16/AM 
.. a decision has been made that the risk of unsecure 
devices is too high and we, therefore, cannot give anyone 
access to [Company's] information until the necessary work 
has been completed. 
I2E15/AS 
.. documented the risk of unsecure and unsupported usage 
of BlackBerry Z10 devices.  
I2E13/AS 
We’ve discussed the risk identified... and a decision has 
been made that the risk of unsecure devices is too high and 









5 ...as stated in our published mobile device management 
policy under roles and responsibilities as follows: 
IS Security Specialist 
Review security considerations and impacts of policy 
Review security impacts of requested exceptions and 
waivers to policy 




..ensure that any changes / decisions are in line with the 
Mobile Device Management policy or make the necessary 
updates to the policy 
·         ensure that all the configuration standards are in line 
with the current Mobile Device Management standards 
·         configure the BlackBerry Server and create the 
relevant IT policies  
I2E7/AS 
...assurance that any changes / decisions are in line with 
the Mobile Device Management policy  
·         assurance that all the configuration standards are in 
line with the current Mobile Device Management standards 
I2E8/AS 
c)The [Company] mobile device management policy 
requires that any new device that is not supported by our 
current mobile device management infrastructure must be 
fully assessed by our Information Security Specialists and 
their recommendations must be implemented in order to 
ensure the security of [Company's] information.  
I2D1 
According to our published “Mobile Device Management” 
policy any device that stores [Company] information must 





Risk management was one of the key strategic focus areas within the company. The 
security of the company’s information had to be taken into consideration to ensure 
that any risks to company information were identified and mitigated.  
Some of the users that had already been allocated the new mobile devices, required 
access to their company information on the device immediately and were not able to 
wait until the necessary work was completed. The risk of giving these users access 
to company information on their mobile devices was documented and after 
consideration it was decided that the risk was too high based on the concepts 
highlighted of ‘Unsecure usage’ and ‘Company data leakage’. Employees were, 
therefore, not allowed to access company information on these mobile devices until 
the necessary information security work was completed. 
“Usage of these devices is a risk to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
[Company's] information as they are not secured through our mobile device 
management infrastructure” (I2D1) 
7.2.2.2 GOVERNANCE ARTEFACT COMPLIANCE 
As the newly chosen mobile device was not compatible with the existing mobile 
infrastructure, this meant that a change needed to be made in order for the device to 
work. The role of the security specialist was to review any changes with regards to 
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devices or sources of information that were not securely supported by the existing 
infrastructure. In order to remain compliant with the existing mobile device 
management policy, one of the governance artefacts developed during the first 
implementation, the information security requirements had to be met or any 
exceptions to the policy had to be signed off by the CIO. 
Another governance artefact mentioned that was developed during the first 
implementation was the mobile device management standards document. All 
configuration standards of the new device needed to be aligned with the existing 
mobile device management standards. 
“...ensure that any changes / decisions are in line with the Mobile Device 
Management policy or make the necessary updates to the policy 
 ensure that all the configuration standards are in line with the current Mobile Device 
Management standards” (I2E8/AS) 
The sub-categories of “Drivers of information security governance consideration’ are 



























The category of “Implementation of new mobile technology” consists of two sub-
categories namely: ‘Investigate new mobile technology’ and ‘Information security 
consideration’ as shown in Table 11 and are described further below. 
TABLE 10 ‐ IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY 







8 As you know – with the new environment and devices, the 
handheld generates two profiles as soon as you add it to 
the network. A personal profile and a work profile. Be 
default everything is accessed from both profiles and we 
HAVE to look at setting IT policies to block this. 
I2E4/TS 
Then there is the fact that we ourselves don’t know how the 
devices work. I don’t feel it is a good idea to add VIP users 
right now. I am worried that should they contact us for 
assistance or support that we are not geared for 
professionally assisting them. I don’t want us to sound 
unprofessional when approached by a VIP (or any business 
person for that may). 
I2E4/TS 
Technically, the device cannot work with the existing 
infrastructure and, therefore, new development and 
production servers are being installed especially for this one 
new mobile device. 
I2E18/AS 
... but we are doing our best at a rapid rate on technology 
that is very new. We have been running BES5 for many 
years and we know the product inside out. Please don’t 
think that we are just sitting back. We are pushing to get to 
know this product (amongst other deliveries). BES 10 is the 
latest and except for some settings – it is a completely new 
product. 
I2E4/TS 
We have no installed the Blackberry 10 server backend. We 
have 2 devices configured successfully after ironing out 
minor issues. 
My question is ……. What now? 
How do we take this forward? 
I2E5/TS 
... we need to just stop and think about some concerns. 
The new device has 2 profiles – personal and work and 
both of these are treated differently on the phone and from 
the backend. 
What do we lock down on the device? 
What do we allow? 
Do we control polices between the profiles? 
Blackberry 10 is based on Active Sync. User LAN password 
change will affect the device and how do we handle that 
load? 
My point is we have all these questions. Technical support 
will configure the environment to apply the rules that is 
decided on, BUT who decides that? 
I2E5/TS 
..research in terms of how the device works, we currently do 
not have any technical documentation for the device and 




On my side, I will need the expertise of [Third party 
vendor], to be educated on what the capabilities on the 







5 The reason for this is the fact that this device may not be 
used to store and access [Company] information until it has 
been configured, tested and suitable infrastructure has been 
set up to meet [Company] information security 
requirements.  
I2E16/AM 
c)The [Company] mobile device management policy 
requires that any new device that is not supported by our 
current mobile device management infrastructure must be 
fully assessed by our Information Security Specialists and 
their recommendations must be implemented in order to 
ensure the security of [Company's] information.  
I2D1 
 
...an information security assessment of the device to 
ensure that [Company]’s information is protected 
I2E7/AS 
 an information security assessment of the BlackBerry Z10 
device  
I2E8/AS 
Based on current workload, IS has committed to have 
completed all related work including information 
security  assessment, infrastructure configuration, testing in 
our environment and updating of policy and standards by 




The new mobile device chosen as the company standard device worked differently 
to the existing mobile devices and was a completely new product. The technical 
specialist needed to understand how the device worked so that once the device was 
allocated to business users; they would be able to provide the required support for 
the device. 
The new generation mobile device consisted of two profiles, a work and a personal 
profile. Once the server was installed and configured, questions arose regarding the 
two profiles and who the decision makers were as far as the IT policy settings for this 
mobile device. The architectures, governance and security team was approached in 
order to make the relevant decisions. 
“Technical support will configure the environment to apply the rules that is decided 






The sub-category of ‘Information security consideration’ consists of the activities 
required to review the security considerations of any change proposals which had be 
done according to the governance artefacts developed during the first 
implementation. As a result of the new mobile device chosen, there were a number 
of activities that needed to be completed so as to integrate the device into the 
existing infrastructure. One of the activities was to complete a security assessment 
of the configuration settings of the device and also to gain an understanding of how 
this new device could be integrated into the existing architecture so that the best 
decision could be made taking the overall mobility architecture into consideration. 
7.2.3.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘DEMAND FOR NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY’ AND 
‘INVESTIGATE NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY’ 
Evidence of the relationship between ‘Demand for new mobile technology’ and 
‘Investigate new mobile technology’ is as follows: 
“research in terms of how the device works, we currently do not have any technical 
documentation for the device and cannot make the necessary decisions” (I2E7/AS) 
‘Demand for new mobile technology’ prompts ‘Investigate new mobile technology’. 
7.2.3.4 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘INVESTIGATE NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY’ ‘AND 
‘INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATION 
Evidence of the relationship between ‘Investigate new mobile technology’ and 
‘Information security consideration’ is as follows: 
“The reason for this is the fact that this device may not be used to store and access 
[Company] information until it has been configured, tested and suitable infrastructure 
has been set up to meet [Company] information security requirements”  (I2E16/AM) 
‘Investigate new mobile technology’ initiates ‘Information security consideration’. 
7.2.3.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘RISKS TO COMPANY INFORMATION’ AND 
‘INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS’ 
Evidence of the relationship between ‘Risks to company information’ and 
‘Information security considerations’ is as follows: 
“A security assessment is not a trivial exercise and is done to mitigate risks to 
company information” (I2E11/AM) 
93 
 
‘Risks to company information’ drives ‘Information security consideration’. 
7.2.3.6 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘GOVERNANCE ARTEFACT COMPLIANCE’ AND 
‘INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATION’ 
Evidence of the relationship between ‘Information security consideration’ and 
‘governance artefact compliance’ is as follows: 
“...as stated in our published mobile device management policy under roles and 
responsibilities as follows: 
• Review security considerations of change proposals” (I2E11/AM) 
 
‘Governance artifact compliance’ mandates ‘Information security consideration’. 
 
Figure 25 depicts the inclusion of the category ‘Implementation of new mobile 





















































The category of “Provide secure environment” consists of the concept “Protect 
company information as shown in Table 12 and further discussed below. 
TABLE 11 ‐ PROVIDE SECURE ENVIRONMENT 






4 ... this device may not be used to store and access 
[Company] information until it has been configured, tested 
and suitable infrastructure has been set up to meet 
[Company] information security requirements. 
I2E16/AM 
... must be fully assessed by our Information Security 
Specialists and their recommendations must be 
implemented in order to ensure the security of [Company's] 
information.  
I2D1 
We have had an initial meeting and have found that some 
investigative work needs to take place to ensure that 
[Company's] information is protected with the new 
BlackBerry 10. 
·         an information security assessment of the device to 
ensure that [Company]’s information is protected 
I2E7/AS 
The following work is being conducted with regards to the 
BlackBerry Z10 device in order to ensure that [Company]’s 




Ultimately, the company information must be protected. This was done by adhering 
to the mobile device management policy and standards, completing the necessary 
security related work and identifying any risks to the company information which had 
to be mitigated. 
7.2.4.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATION’ AND 
‘PROTECT COMPANY INFORMATION’ 
Evidence of the relationship between ‘Information security consideration’ and 
‘Protect company information’ is as follows: 
“... must be fully assessed by our Information Security Specialists and their 
recommendations must be implemented in order to ensure the security of 
[Company's] information.” (I2D1) 
 





The new generation mobile device was not compatible with the existing infrastructure 
which meant that a security assessment was required to ensure the safeguarding of 
the company information being accessed on these devices. The act of doing the 
information security assessment meant that the mobile security governance artefacts 
including technology were complied with and, therefore, would comply with any 
future audit in the mobile device environment and ultimately protects the company’s 
information. 
The information security consideration was a necessary step not only to ensure the 
protection of the company’s information but also to remain compliant with audit 
requirements. 
“We have internal audit that reviews our compliance to policy” (1.4.21) 
7.2.5.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ‘INFORMATION SECURITY CONSIDERATION’ AND 
‘ENSURE COMPLIANCE’ 
The auditor mentioned in the first implementation that the starting point of the audit is 
“policies and procedures and talk to people responsible for the process” (1.2.23). 
This was done to elicit information and determine whether the documented policy 
statements and processes have been followed. 
“Ensure compliance’ mandates ‘Information security consideration’. 
7.2.6 EMPLOYEE DISSATISFACTION 
The shortage of information security specialists had an impact on the completion 
date which was based on current workload and priorities. Company information 
could not be stored on this new mobile device until all activities, including the 
information security assessment, were completed. This led to a number of unhappy 








The evidence of the relationship between ‘Information security consideration’ and 
‘Employee dissatisfaction’ is as follows: 
“My current blackberry is not in good shape (some of the keys are not working). I am 
happy even if I can just use as a normal phone (but must have my contacts) for now 
until they are able to address the emails issue” (I2E52/EU5). 
‘Information security consideration’ aggravates ‘Employee dissatisfaction’. 
Figure 26 illustrates all categories, sub-categories and concepts with all relationships 



























































Open, axial and selective coding was done for each implementation. All categories 
that are displayed in the previous diagrams have been deemed important to that 
particular implementation. Further selective coding was used to link relevant 
categories from both implementations to the central phenomenon of ‘Information 
security governance implementation’ in order to formulate a theoretical framework as 
suggested by Strauss and Corbin (as cited in Pozzebon et al., 2011). 
Figure 27 below depicts the common categories, sub-categories and concepts that 





























































































A number of categories and concepts have emerged as being common to both 
implementations such as “Risks to company information”, “Ensure compliance”, 
“Employee dissatisfaction” and “Provide secure environment”. Each of these is 
discussed below. 
The concept of “Risks to company information” was highlighted by both 
implementations as one of the drivers. It was the reason for implementing mobile 
information security governance at the organisation and is constantly reflected on 
when any new mobile technology is being demanded by the Business. 
The category of “Employee dissatisfaction” has been highlighted as a consequence 
of both implementations but there are different reasons for the dissatisfaction. The 
first implementation has a strong concept of change management, which was 
lacking, causing employee dissatisfaction. The second implementation led to 
employee dissatisfaction due to the delay caused by the need to remain compliant 
with the mobile information security governance, which was essential to ensure that 
any potential risks related to the introduction of the new mobile technology was 
mitigated. 
“Ensure compliance” was common in both implementations. Compliance was 
ensured via technology, a manual intervention to ensure governance artefact 
compliance and lastly via internal audit. The first implementation ensured that mobile 
information security governance was in place before the audit took place; therefore, 
the sub-category of “mobility audit” was a prominent driver. The second 
implementation does not show “mobility audit” as a driver but shows the influence of 
“governance artefact compliance as being a driver of ‘Consider mobile information 
security’ which led to ‘Governance artefact compliance’. In this instance, 
‘Governance artefact compliance’ is a driver as well as a consequence. By ensuring 
compliance to the governance artefacts, indirectly there is a compliance with audit. 
“Provide secure environment” was a category highlighted by both implementations 
which means that the goal of implementing or considering mobile information 
security governance was to protect the company’s information. 




Strauss and Corbin define the storyline as the “conceptualization of the story” which 
is a “descriptive narrative about the central phenomenon of the study” (as cited in 
Birks, Mills, Francis & Chapman, 2009). The storyline as a technique of analysis is 
most commonly associated with grounded theory research which aims to explain 
phenomena in the context within which it exists by producing theory (Birks et al., 
2009). 
Strauss and Corbin describes the storyline as a tool which aids theoretical 
development and later describes it also as a means of integrating theory during the 
process of analysis (as cited Birks et al., 2009). Strauss and Corbin have delayed 
the use of the storyline until later coding stages, whereas Birks et al. (2009) argue 
that in grounded theory the storyline can be used throughout the research process 
so that the final theory is constructed, integrated and finally made visible. The 
authors claim that a theory that may otherwise have been dry and unpalatable is 
brought to life by the power of the storyline from a pragmatic perspective. 
Birks et al. (2009) have suggested guiding principles for writing the storyline through 
the mnemonic ‘TALES’ as shown in Figure 28: 
 
FIGURE 28 ‐ GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WRITING THE STORYLINE (BIRKS ET AL., 2009) 
The process of open, axial and selective coding has resulted in the grounded theory 
emerging from the data depicted in Figure 29 below. The storyline will be used to 
explain the theoretical framework from two perspectives using the two units of 
analysis within the case study which then results in the final theory emerging as 
depicted in Figure 31. The two perspectives are: 
1. No mobile information security governance in place 
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2. Mobile information security governance in place, new or change proposal to 
be considered 
A process view has been used to depict and explain the storyline which ends in the 
development of the final grounded theory. 
7.3.2.1 PERSPECTIVE ONE: NO MOBILE INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN 
PLACE 
The theory as depicted in Figure 29 below consists of six process steps which are 
categorised into areas of high risk, mitigate risk and low risk. The idea behind the 
framework is that when risks are first identified they could potentially be considered 
as a high risk until it has been investigated and something is done to mitigate the 
risk, it then moves into the area of low risk because the chances of the risk occurring 









































The protection of company information starts with identifying any risks that could 
potentially impact the company in a negative way. Awareness of these risks to 
company information is brought about from a number of sources whether it is from 
an external source such as industry information, disseminated via newsletters and 
conferences, or an internal source that identifies the risk within the company. In this 
case, the risks identified were related to the increasing number of users accessing 
company information on their mobile devices which did not have the necessary 
controls applied in order to mitigate the risks.  
The risks identified with regards to mobile devices were the potential loss or leakage 
of confidential company information and also access to confidential company 
information by unauthorised users. These risks could potentially not only have an 
impact on the company information but also on the bottom line of the company. The 
example explained was that a cellphone was taken and all meetings were removed 
from the calendar, this replicated to the server resulting in all meetings for the next 
six months being cancelled. This scenario could potentially have happened to one of 
the company’s sales personnel which meant that the company’s revenue could have 
been impacted. 
7.3.2.1.2 PLAN MOBILITY AUDIT AND DEVELOP MOBILITY STRATEGY 
The risk within the mobile device management environment was identified by the 
Information Services department and was, therefore, part of the Information Services 
strategy, and the company’s Enterprise, Risk and Assurance department and, 
therefore, landed on the internal audit plan. 
Multiple sources of risk identification within companies are necessary because it 









As a result of the risks identified, a mobile information security governance 
implementation was initiated and expedited by management to meet the impending 
internal audit requirements and to mitigate the risks related to the organisation’s 
information. As a result of the time pressure being experienced due to the mobility 
audit, it was felt that the quickest way to complete the implementation before the 
mobility audit was to have a small dedicated team since it was believed that this 
would speed up the implementation process. The team was established to setup the 
technical environment and develop the policies, processes and standards. Controls 
such as a password, encryption, remote wipe and timeout were applied to all mobile 
devices requiring access to company information. Only those mobile devices that 
were compatible with the mobile device management software and were able to 
have the controls applied were allowed access to company information.  
Unfortunately, stakeholder involvement, communication, device education, change 
management were not done well and led to a number of unhappy users. Although 
“Employee dissatisfaction” is not a process step, it is highlighted within the model 
since there was such a significant impact on the employees. Some employees could 
no longer access their company information on their mobile devices because it was 
not compatible with the mobile device management software or their devices did not 
support some of the security controls such as encryption and were, therefore, forced 
to replace their mobile devices. The main focus of the mobile information security 
governance implementation was to protect the company’s information and having the 
necessary governance in place before the planned mobility audit took place. 
7.3.2.1.4 ENSURE COMPLIANCE 
Different mechanisms are in place to ensure that the security controls and all 
governance artefacts such as the mobile device management policy, standards, 
processes and software are adhered to.  
Users of mobile devices that were not compatible with the implemented mobile 
device management software were no longer allowed to access their company 
information on their mobile devices which led to dissatisfaction. Users did not have a 
choice as the security controls were applied via a system policy. Some users chose 
to no longer access their company information on their mobile device because they 
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felt that it was an invasion of their privacy, they were not happy that someone else 
was able to control their personal device and they were scared that their personal 
information would be compromised. In the end, the users who required access to 
their company information on their mobile device accepted that they needed to abide 
by the mobile device management software, policy, processes and standards.  
Compliance is not only ensured via the mobile device management software but also 
through a manual intervention by the architectures and governance team and the 
internal audit department at the company which reviews compliance to the 
governance artefacts on a periodic basis. 
7.3.2.1.5 PROVIDE SECURE ENVIRONMENT 
The information security governance implementation applied security controls in the 
mobile device environment where none previously existed. The end goal was to 
provide a secure environment and while it was recognised that it was not possible to 
have a totally secure environment, the continual identification of risks, the 
implementation or consideration of information security governance and the 
















The theory as depicted in Figure 30 below consists of five process steps which are 















The company-owned mobile devices are managed by the Procurement department 
and as a result the mobile device chosen as the company standard was not 
compatible with the existing mobile infrastructure. The choice was seen to be the 
most logical choice given the fact that the company had used this brand of device for 
a number of years. The new mobile device chosen as the company standard device 
worked differently to the existing mobile devices and was a completely new product.  
7.3.2.2.2 IDENTIFY RISKS TO COMPANY INFORMATION 
Unfortunately, these new devices had already been allocated to users and they were 
not able to access their company information on their device. Some of these users 
were not happy to wait until the necessary work was completed and wanted to have 
access to their company information on their mobile device without the necessary 























documentation of the risk associated with giving these users access to company 
information on these new mobile devices which were unsecure and unsupported. 
After consideration it was decided that the risk was too high based on the concepts 
of “Unsecure usage” and “Company data leakage”. This highlights the link between 
‘Demand for new technology’ and ‘Identify risks to company information’. 
If the business users were willing to accept the risk, it needed to be signed off by the 
CIO according to the mobile device management policy. This was not the case and, 
therefore, the business users had to wait until all the necessary work was completed. 
This highlights the link between the process steps ‘Demand new technology’ and 
‘Consider mobile information security governance’.  
7.3.2.2.3 CONSIDER INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
The new generation mobile device consisted of two profiles, a work and a personal 
profile. Once the server was installed and configured, questions arose regarding the 
two profiles and who the decision makers were as far as the IT policy settings for this 
mobile device. The architectures, governance and security team was approached in 
order to make the relevant decisions. 
According to the mobile device management policy developed, the role of the 
security specialist was to review any changes with regards to devices or sources of 
information that are not securely supported by the existing infrastructure. A security 
assessment of the configuration settings of the new mobile device and also an 
understanding of how this new device could be integrated into the existing 
architecture so that the best decision could be made taking the overall mobility 
architecture into consideration was required. Any risks to company information were 
identified and mitigated as part of the information security assessment. This 
highlights the iteration between the steps ‘Identify risks to company information’ and 
‘Consider information security governance’.  
The shortage of information security specialists had an impact on the completion 
date which was based on the current workload and priorities. Company information 
could not be stored on this new mobile device until all activities including the 
information security assessment were completed. This led to dissatisfaction amongst 
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employees because some of them were due for mobile upgrades and some had 
faulty devices. 
7.3.2.2.4 ENSURE COMPLIANCE 
Compliance to the governance artefacts such as the mobile device management 
policy and standards was achieved by meeting the information security requirements 
and by not allowing access to company information on the new mobile devices until 
the necessary work including the security assessment was completed. The security 
controls defined in the first implementation were applied and tested on the new 
mobile devices before giving users access to their company information. 
In doing these activities, when the mobile device management environment is 
audited in future, all the necessary work as specified in the mobile device 
management policy would have been done and should, therefore, not result in any 
audit findings because compliance was ensured. 
7.3.2.2.5 PROVIDE SECURE ENVIRONMENT 
The mobile information security governance implemented during the first 
implementation was used to govern the mobile device management environment for 
the second implementation. The identification of the risk of ‘Unsecure usage’ and 
‘Company leakage’ with the new mobile device can be seen as the starting point. 
The information security of the new devices was considered and implemented and, 
therefore, these new devices have safely been integrated into the company’s mobile 
environment with all the necessary security controls applied. By ensuring compliance 
to the information security governance artefacts developed during the first 
implementation, the risks associated with the new mobile device were mitigated 
thereby keeping the mobile device management area as close as possible to a 
secure environment.  
7.4 FINAL GROUNDED THEORY IN RELATION TO EXISTING LITERATURE 
As a result of the iterative nature between the process steps ‘Identify risks to 
company information’ and ‘Implement/consider information security governance’, the 
grounded theory developed was updated to reflect the gap that was highlighted 
during the development of the storyline. According to Birks et al. (2009) this is an 
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advantage of using the storyline because it highlights gaps, holes and 
inconsistencies in a grounded theory and makes the limitations obvious in the same 
way as a story would be incomplete if pages were torn from a novel. 
The final grounded theory illustrates that risks to company information must be 
considered so that any potential risks with new or change proposals are detected as 
depicted in Figure 31 below. This theory shows that once mobile information security 
governance is in place, it must always be considered when any new or changes are 
proposed to the mobile environment to ensure that any potential risks are mitigated.  
Employee dissatisfaction has been highlighted in the theory because it emerged as a 
strong concept during the analysis. As a result of insufficient change management 
and the process of trying to remain compliant with the mobile information security 
governance, there were implications on the satisfaction of the organisation’s 
employees. This may be a concept that organisations should take more seriously 
when implementing mobile information security governance since there are 
implications of ignoring the satisfaction of employees. The implications and how the 










































Little literature exists on how organisations go about implementing information 
security governance within the mobile device environment. This research has made 
a contribution because many organisations are struggling with the concept of 
information security governance within the mobile device environment and has shed 
some light with regards to the issues organisations may face such as device 
fragmentation and change management. 
Each category, sub-category and concept highlighted in the final grounded theory 
depicted in Figure 31 are discussed further in relation to existing literature. 
7.4.1.1 MOBILITY STRATEGY 
Best practice frameworks such as COBIT includes strategy as part of one of their 
main focus areas, plan and organise, for IT governance. IT plans must be developed 
and aligned with the organisation’s business strategies (IT Governance Institute, 
2004). ‘Mobility strategy’ is a relevant sub-category since employees are increasingly 
moving towards using mobile devices to accesss company information. Ernst and 
Young (2012a) state that technologies such as mobile computing must be included 
as part of a new information security strategy and should focus on identifying current 
risks from a fresh perspective due to technology advancements such as mobile 
computing.  
7.4.1.2 MOBILITY AUDIT 
Audit was specifically excluded from the definition of information security governance 
by Moulton and Coles (2003) because the authors felt that it does not form part of 
information security governance. ‘Mobility audit’, however, is still a valid sub-category 
as a driver and as a consequence of the mobile information security governance 
implementation since audit ensures that the governance processes are established 
and functions properly (Moulton & Coles, 2003). Audit aids in ensuring that the 
organisation’s data contained in systems are secure (Von Solms, 2006). In the case 
of this research, audit was the main driver of the implementation which led to all 
necessary governance artefacts such as policies, technology, processes and 





The identification of current risks and an understanding of what the most important 
data and applications are and where they reside should be part of the company’s 
information security strategy. A fresh perspective is required when identifying risks, it 
should not be a process of carrying forward the previous years risks since the risks 
to company information are different because there are different points of exposure 
(Ernst & Young, 2012a) such as new mobile technologies. The concept of ‘Risks to 
company information’ is valid, it may not be a new concept but due to the 
advancement of technology and the increasing number of employees using mobile 
devices for personal and business use, organisations are more vulnerable to new 
risks associated with mobility. 
7.4.1.4 NEW MOBILE TECHNOLOGY 
When the year 2016 arrives, approximately 10 billion internet enabled mobile 
devices will be in existence which equates to every man, woman and child on the 
planet owning 1.5 of those devices according to a Cisco forecast. Mobile devices are 
used for both personal and business activities, no longer solely for telephone calls 
but as a knowledge source and communications tool. The evolving mobile 
technologies have resulted in organisations urgently implementing mobile policies in 
order to address the risks to company information (Ernst & Young, 2012a). This 
confirms the validity of the concept of ‘New mobile technology’. Technology 
advancement together with the benefits to the employee have led to an increase in 
the adoption of mobile technology (Ernst & Young, 2012a) and due to the vast range 
of evolving mobile technologies, the implementation of mobile information security 
governance is important because no longer are mobile devices such as tablets used 
by executives alone but by the rest of the organisation as well.  
7.4.1.5 MOBILE INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
IMPLEMENTATION/CONSIDERATION 
The category relating to the implementation and consideration of information security 
governance is validated by a global information security survey conducted by Ernst 
and Young (2012a) showing an increase in the number of external attacks noticed by 
respondents from 41% in 2009 to 71% in 2011 and to 77% in 2012. According to this 
survey, organisations have also noticed an increase in internal vulnerabilities of 
which 37% of the respondents felt that the threat that increased the most over the 
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past 12 months was that of unaware employees (Ernst and Young, 2012a). This also 
validates the change management aspect of a mobile information security 
governance implementation, education should form part of the implementation 
relaying the importance of security to the employees (Whitman, 2003). It is important 
that all aspects of information security governance are considered during an 
implementation. 
7.4.1.6 ENSURE COMPLIANCE 
‘Ensure compliance’ is a valid category since a fundamental requirement for any 
information security initiative is increasing an end-user’s compliance with information 
security policies (Padayachee, 2012). This research shows that various methods 
accomplish compliance to policies such as the use of systems, manual interventions 
and regular audit reviews. 
7.4.1.7 EMPLOYEE DISSATISFACTION 
A study undertaken by Post and Kagan (2007) indicate that generally employees 
perceive that there is a greater interference with their job responsibilities when more 
onerous measures or increases in security practices and policies are enforced. 
‘Employee dissatisfaction’ is, therefore, a valid category. When information security 
controls are designed and implemented more care should be shown towards 
employees so that there is less interference with employees’ job roles and their 
productivity. In order to accomplish this, Post and Kagan (2007) suggests that the 
employees must be a part of the security design policy which should result in 
minimum user disruption and maximum user access. This may alleviate the 
concerns raised regarding organisations being at risk because their information 
security policies are not being followed by their employees (Siponen et al., 2009). 
The mobile information security policy must allow user access without affecting the 
employees task completion and job performance while protecting the organisation’s 








The conceptual framework (Figure 10) developed from literature shows how all the 
information security governance themes whether they are technical or non-technical 
all work together to ensure a secure environment for the organisation.  ‘Provide 
secure environment’ is a valid category because it is ultimately what information 
security governance works towards, ensuring “that the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) of the company’s electronic assets (data, information, software, 
hardware, people, etc.) are maintained at all times” (Von Solms, 2006, p. 167). The 
conceptual framework developed from the information security governance themes 
is valid within the mobile device environment. If all aspects of the conceptual 
framework are considered, the security around the organisation’s information 
accessed on mobile devices will lead to a more secure mobile device environment. 
8 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
8.1 LIMITATIONS 
The research was restricted by the timing and duration of the master’s course.  
Two implementations were analysed, the initial implementation investigated the 
implementation of information security governance whereas the second one 
investigated and analysed the impact the first implementation had on the second 
one. This was the only implementation that was investigated and analysed to 
determine the impact that the information security governance had on the 
implementation due to time constraints. It may have been more beneficial to be able 
to analyse additional subsequent implementations so that the emergent theory could 
be further grounded in data by possibly adding additional scenarios to the storyline. 
The paradigm model was used to form relationships between categories and sub-
categories. The research mostly focused on the causal conditions, the phenomenon, 
actions/ interactions and consequences. The contextual conditions and intervening 






This research is a good starting point for further research. Many avenues were 
identified as part of the research but were not pursued and could potentially be 
further investigated as described below: 
• A comparison between the role of the IT auditor, risk management and 
information security governance within organizations. 
• How will organisations cope with device fragmentation as technology 
advancement will intensify the problem. 
• Should the management of mobile devices continue to reside in departments 
outside of the Information Services department when the technical specialists 
are the ones that hold the knowledge about the complexities of the 
company’s mobility architecture and devices, and know whether it will work 
within the existing environment? 
• The influence of vendors on the Business with regards to technology products 
and the associated impacts. 
• The alignment of Business and IT with regards to information security. The 
Business’s perception of information security is quite different from IT’s 
perspective. The business users generally feel like they can take riskier 
decisions with company information because they do not see the information 
as being confidential company information. 
• The ownership of business information. The true owners of business 
information reside in the business but they do not feel accountable for the 
information because they are too far removed from the deemed 
accountability. The assumption made is that the CIO is accountable and 
responsible for company information. How do organisations go about shifting 
the ownership of business information? 
• Lastly, the main aim of information security is to protect the company’s 
information from potential risks, yet there is a risk to personal information as 
well from an employee’s perspective. Employees are also taking a risk by 
using their personal mobile device in order to be more effective in their jobs 
and ultimately for the benefit of the company but how is the employee’s 




Most employees prefer to use their own personal devices for work purposes which 
pose many challenges to the organisation from a technology perspective such as 
device fragmentation and many risks to company information such as company data 
leakage and unauthorised access. Mobile information security governance is able to 
address these risks.  All risks to company information must be identified whether the 
implementation is a planned or unplanned one so that the mobile information 
security governance is considered. Changes within the existing mobile environment 
(new or change to existing) are considered to be potentially high risks to company 
information until they have been assessed and accepted or mitigated. Once the 
mobile information security governance has been implemented, compliance must be 
ensured which provides assurance that risks to company information are constantly 
mitigated. When this is done, the organisation may move from a state of having high 
risks to company information, to mitigating or accepting those risks, to a low risk 
state because the mobile information security governance has been considered or 
implemented. This is done to ultimately provide a secure environment for the 
organisation.  
This research has shown how organisations go about implementing information 
security governance within the mobile device environment which is pertinent due to 
the increasing number of employees using their personal mobile devices in both a 
personal and professional context. A grounded case study strategy enabled the 
research question to be answered and theory to be development with the use of 
procedures and techniques of the grounded theory methodology. 
The research confirms that it is important that all aspects of information security 
governance are taken into consideration such as user awareness to avoid 
dissatisfied employees which will ultimately impact on employee productivity, job 
roles and conformance with policy. The research has also revealed that governance 
alone is not sufficient to protect the company’s information. An integrated view as 
suggested by Racz, Weippl, and Seufert (2010) of governance, risk management 
and compliance is necessary.  
While the existing research focused on mobile information security governance 
implementation and while it is recognised that it is not possible to have a completely 
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secure environment, the research has found that the close relationship between risk 
management, information security governance and compliance is vital to striving 
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted and the questions listed below were 
used as a guide to conduct the first interview, after analysing the data collected a 
decision was made as to what data needed to be collected next. 
PARTICIPANT OVERVIEW 
1. Briefly describe your role in the organisation. 
2. How many years experience do you have in this role? 
3. What is your understanding of information security? 
CONTEXT 
4. Describe what the mobility implementation was about and why is it was 
initiated.  
5. Describe the goals and objectives of the mobility implementation. 
6. How has the mobility implementation been aligned with the business goals 
and objectives and how can this be verified? 
PRE‐IMPLEMENTATION 
7. How did the team go about designing the mobility implementation? Who was 
involved? 
8.  What was the scope of the implementation plan?  
9. What activities were undertaken before the implementation started? Were 
there any activities that were omitted that should have taken place prior to 
implementation?  
10. Who signed off / gave the go-ahead of the mobility implementation? Was 
there a formal document that was signed off? 
11. Was executive management involved in the decision to go ahead with the 
implementation? If not, would it have made a difference and how? If yes, do 
you think that it had an impact on the implementation and how? 
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12. If best practices are mentioned in the pre-implementation questions, then how 
effective was the use of best practices? 
13. When did the actual implementation take place? 
INFORMATION SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES 
14. What technologies were used for the implementation? How were they 
selected? Are the technologies chosen effective and why? 
15. Do you think the right decision was made in terms of the technology chosen 
and why? 
POLICIES, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 
16. Were the relevant information security policies, processes and procedures 
related to the implementation created or updated? Was this done prior to 
implementation? 
17. How effective are the organisation’s information security policies, processes 
and procedures? If possible, please provide examples. 
18. Are the policies effectively implemented and managed and how? 
INFORMATION SECURITY CULTURE 
19. How would you describe an information security culture at an organisation and 
would you say that the organisation has an information security culture? Why? 
20. Has the mobility implementation contributed to creating an information 
security culture? If yes, is this within the IS division only or within the broader 
organisation/ business as well? Why or why not? 
21. Do you think that people actually understand why the mobility implementation 
was necessary? How do you think people feel about it? Was it easily accepted 
by people? Was there any resistance? Why were people resisting? What were 
the complaints? 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES 
22. How has the implementation changed the existing organisational structure? 
23. Do you think the information security structure created is effective? 
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25.  Were the roles and responsibilities clearly defined between the various 
teams? 
AWARENESS AND THREATS 
26. How serious do you think threats to information are from a mobility 
perspective? Can you provide practical examples? 
27. Do you think that people are generally aware of threats to information and 
how serious it is? Elaborate. 
COMPLIANCE 
28. How are we ensuring compliance with the mobility policy? Are employees 
complying with the mobility policy? 
TRUST, COMMITMENT, CURRENCIES OF EXCHANGE, 
ALLIANCES 
29. Do you think that the implementation accomplished the goals that it initially 
intended? So, it was a successful implementation? 
30. If yes, what makes it a successful implementation? 
31. If not, what could have been done differently to make it more successful? 
32. Do you think good relationships have been formed between team members? 
33. Have the information security professionals been able to supply you with 
information security information or assistance when required? 
34. Do you feel comfortable enough with the information security professionals to 







35. Do you think that the implementation has made the environment more 
secure? How? 
36. What activities could have contributed to a better implementation? 
37. Are there any comments, suggestions or recommendations in terms of what 




























The Department of Information Systems at the University of Cape Town requires a dissertation for the 
successful completion of a masters degree in Information Systems. A study entitled “How do 
organisations go about implementing information security governance for mobile devices” has been 
chosen. 
 
The objective of the research is to gain an understanding of how organisations implement information 
security governance and the impact it has on subsequent mobile related implementations.  
 An analysis of the first Mobile Device Management implementation is being done and since the 
BlackBerry implementation is the second most recently completed mobile implementation, I would like 
to include it as part of the research that I am busy conducting. At this stage of the research, interviews 
will not be required. Secondary data such as email correspondence, etc. will be collected and 
analysed for the BlackBerry implementation. Interviews may be required at a later stage to confirm the 
data that has been analysed. 
 
All information that is collected is for the sole purpose of the aforementioned dissertation and for 
academic purposes only. Any findings may be reported in a journal. No personal details will be 
disclosed. 
 
The research will be beneficial to [Company] as it will provide a better understanding of the process 
and recommendations can be made for any future implementations. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns with regards to the research being conducted, please let me 
know.  
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11.5 APPENDIX E – DESCRIPTIVE LEVEL OF DETAIL FOR IMPLEMENTATION ONE 
 
 
